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GIDEON'S TRUMPET:
TAPS FOR AN ANTIQUATED SYSTEM?
A PROPOSAL FOR KENTUCKY
By DANIEL G. GROVE*
I. INTRODUCTION

The plight of the indigent criminal defendant was dramatically
thrust into public view by the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.' Since that opinion was handed
down legal scholars, judges and legislators have seized upon the
increased interest of the layman in the problem to constructively
evaluate and criticize the existing systems and lack thereof for
providing legal representation to indigents. This article is designed to survey and analyze the indigent's right to counsel in
Kentucky and to propose legislation intended to remedy the defi2
ciencies presently existing in that system.
The survey of the actual practice in Kentucky is based upon
the results of a questionnaire submitted to the circuit judges of
the Commonwealth. The analysis stems from the comments of the
answering judges, the theories of commentators and the constitutional guarantees propounded by several courts. Finally the
legislative proposal was drafted after consideration of the practical
difficulties existing in installing a workable system in a large,
predominantly rural state such as Kentucky. It is by no means the
only answer to the present problems, indeed, other acceptable
solutions are also suggested and discussed. However, in view of
0

LL.B., University of Virginia; member, Virginia Bar.
The Court held for the first time that indigent
criminal defendants were entitled to have counsel represent them in any criminal
proceeding involving the charge of a serious crime in a state court. Many articles
ave been written concerning the meaning and application of this case, some of
which are relied upon here. For an interesting and entertaining explanation of the
entire case, see Lewis. Gideon's Trumpet (1964).
2 This article and the proposed statute are the product of a project carried
out by the author under the auspices of the Attorney General's office during the
summer of 194 as a legal aide. Though it is highly probable that some type of
legislation concerning counsel for the indigent will be offered to the next session
of the General Assembly, the exact form and content of such legislation is unlmownN to the author. This article is then, merely a suggestion without the official
endorsement of the Attorney General's office or any other state agency.
1372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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recent Court opinions redefining the "right to counsel" and
"equal protection of the laws" in state court proceedings, it is
quite possible that the present standards will be broadened in subsequent opinions, and so any system adopted should be capable of
meeting the challenge of the future. Even if the prediction concerning the broadening of constitutional guarantees is not realized,
Kentucky should attempt to enact a system that will afford a
maximum of represenation, not limited to minimal constitutional
rights, in a manner best designed to facilitate a fair and efficient
administration of criminal justice for the accused as well as the
Commonwealth.

II. THE

PRESENT SYSTEM

A. Legislation
Kentucky Constitution section 11 provides, inter alia, "in all
criminal prosecutions the accused has the right to be heard by
himself and counsel. . . ." This provision has long been interpreted to afford an indigent accused of a felony the right to have
effective counsel appointed to represent him.3 This right is more
broadly granted by a statute 4 which has been interpreted as giving
the court discretion to appoint counsel in civil as well as criminal
cases.5 The right to counsel in criminal cases is more specifically
granted by rules 2.14 and 8.04 of the recently revised Kentucky
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 2.14 provides:
(1) A person arrested and in jail shall have the right to make
immediate communications for the purpose of securing the
services of an attorney.
(2) Any attorney-at-law entitled to practice in the courts of
this Commonwealth shall, at the request of the person arrested,
or of some one acting in his behalf, be permitted to visit the
person arrested.
Although this particular rule has never been tested in court, the
annotator suggests that its purpose is to reverse the results of
3See

McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 181 Ky. 766, 205 S.W. 915 (1918).

Because Kentucky has long recognized this right, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) did not force any change in order to meet constitutional guarantees.

4 Ky. Rev. Stat. 453.190 (1963) [heeinafter cited as KRS1 which states "[A]
court may allow a poor person residing in this state to prosecute or defend any
action therein without paying costs, whereupon he shall have any counsel that the
court assigns him and shall have from all officers all needful services without any
fees....

5Wilson v. Melcroft Coal Co., 226 Ky. 744, 11 S.W.2d 932 (1928).
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Crooker v. California,3 which upheld the admissibility of admissions made by the defendant after arrest and subsequent to the
denial of his request for counsel. Rule 8.04 provides:
If on arraignment or thereafter, in felony cases, the defendant
appears in court without counsel, the court shall assign counsel
to represent him at every stage of the proceedings unless he
elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel.
Although the rule makes no mention of indigency that is the
criteria for appointment of counsel under it.7 Rule 2.14 was
obviously intended to permit representation by retained counsel
after arrest, while rule 8.04 was designed to appoint counsel for
indigents at arraignment.8 If the rules are so interpreted and put
into practice on this basis it is likely that constitutional objections
will arise.9
Assuming that these rules are to be interpreted in order to
withstand attack on constitutional grounds, there are other features
of the Kentucky system that should be analyzed. The present
system makes no provision for compensating the appointed counsel
for his services or for the expenses of an independent investigation.'0 Most states do have some provision for compensating assigned counsel.11
The statutory scheme in Kentucky, regarding assigned counsel,
presents somewhat of an anomaly when one considers another
statute 12 which provides for court appointed counsel to represent
persons at mental restoration proceedings. That statute 3 provides
for a ten dollar fee to be paid by the county to appointed counsel.
Thus the defense attorney appointed on behalf of an indigent
accused of rape or murder receives nothing but the thanks of the
court for five days in court and hours of outside preparation while
this same lawyer receives a fee, though nominal, for his appointment in a relatively simple restoration hearing.
6 357 U.S. 483 (1958). See Cicenia v. Legay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
7 Except possibly in cases in which the defendant can afford counsel but
for some reason has been unable to obtain one.
8 See Carson v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.2d 85, 94 (Ky. 1964), cert. denied,
280 U.S. 938 (1965).
9 See discussion pp. 533-39, infra.
10 See Calhoun v. Commonwealth, 301 Ky. 789, 193 S.W.2d 420, 421 (1946).
11 See note 59 infra and accompanying text.
12 KRS 202.295 (1963).
13 ibid.
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The rest of the appointed counsel system is not specifically
governed by legislation, but is set forth below under the general
heading of "Practice."
B. Practice
The results of the survey 14 reveal that the judges answering
make the most of the present system, but are in agreement that
some change is necessary.
Over half of the judges reporting estimate that between forty
and eighty per cent of the criminal defendants in their circuit
claim indigency and request the court to appoint counsel. More
than one-third of these judges will not permit an accused felon to
waive counsel. Those judges that permit waiver report that
between zero and twenty per cent of the criminal defendants who
come before them waive counsel. Almost all of those permitting
waiver admit that it later seemed that some (between one and five
per cent) of these unrepresented defendants could have presented
a worthy defense with the help of counsel. One judge placed the
figure at ten per cent.
Counsel is appointed for all accused felons and a majority of
the judges also honor requests for those accused of more serious
misdemeanors. Appointment is generally made at arraignment or
after indictment, although several judges indicated that a request
would be complied with at any time after arrest. These judges
added that such early appointment is generally impossible due to
the fact that the judge is usually not apprised of the situation
until arraignment. One judge answered that he provides counsel
before the examining trial although he did not elaborate upon the
mechanics of this early appointment.
When assignment is made at arraignment most courts are
liberal in granting the lawyer and defendant time to talk over the
case before a plea is entered. Sixty-five cent of the judges grant
whatever time is necessary before asking for a plea, although one
answered that generally ten minutes is sufficient. One judge grants
twenty-four hours on request while two others permit a week's
14 Most of the information in this section was gathered from a compilation
of the answers of circuit judges to a questionnaire prepared and distributed by
the Attorney General's office during June of 1964. For the complete tabulation of
the results of the questionnaire see the appendix following this article.
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continuance. The two courts that grant no time for consultation
make it a practice to enter a not guilty plea or permit a later
change of plea.
The methods of selecting counsel are diverse. About onequarter appoint any available attorney while approximately the
same number choose in order from a list of the entire bar. About
twenty per cent pick either at random or in order from a list of
criminal lawyers. Ten per cent choose mainly from the younger
members of the bar and a like amount claim to have no system.
Another part of the questionnaire reveals that sixty per cent
of the judges choose only lawyers with prior criminal trial experience while eighty per cent limit their selection to those with
trial experience. This sixty per cent also replied that their appointments are not limited to any segment of the bar. Therefore, it
seems likely that many appointed lawyers are general practitioners
who probably do little criminal work aside from defending indigents. Although only a small percentage answered that selection
was generally from the younger members of the bar, sixty per
cent admitted that lawyers assigned are often younger and less
experienced than the prosecutor. Nevertheless, ninety per cent
felt that in general the experience of assigned counsel is adequate.
Capital cases are the occasion for appointing either more experienced counsel or two attorneys, according to thirty per cent of
the answers. Another fifty per cent replied that this is the practice
in all serious felony cases.
Most judges reported little or no difficulty in obtaining
counsel for all indigent defendants. Only about ten per cent claimed it to be a substantial difficulty. Likewise approximately eighty
per cent claimed that the lawyers appointed exhibited no displeasure as a result of the assignment. However, almost one-quarter regarded the segment of the bar from which they appoint so
small as to place a serious burden on those appointed. The number
of times a man is appointed yearly is relative to the size of the bar
and the amount of criminal work in the county. One county has
only one man who is appointed to every case. Other estimates
range from "once a term for trial" to "four times yearly." Half of
the judges feel the out of pocket expenses borne by assigned
counsel to be burdensome while the rest said it is a trivial burden.
While only ten per cent feel that assigned counsel's preparation
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is inadequate, those judges answering another question estimate
that almost ninety per cent of indigency cases they hear are disposed of with twelve hours or less outside preparation by appointed counsel. It is also estimated that over fifty per cent spend
between zero and three hours in out of court preparation.
The general quality of assigned counsel was described as every" About half of those
thing from "excellent" to "the poorest ..
replying thought that assigned counsel is on par with retained
counsel, although some of the replies were prefaced by the comment that since assignment is by rotation and the entire bar is
engaged in general practice it could not vary much. About fifty
per cent registered some criticism of counsel; this criticism ranged
from inconsistent quality to inexperience and lack of funds to investigate.
A more specific question comparing the performance of assigned counsel to that of retained counsel revealed a more critical
attitude. Sixty-five per cent of the replies stated that assigned
counsel enter more guilty pleas. Eighty per cent felt that assigned
counsel is equal to retained counsel in challenging the admissibility of objectionable evidence. Thirty-five per cent replied that
assigned counsel is less proficient in protecting the record for appeal. And fifty per cent are of the opinion that the assistance of
assigned counsel is achieving the proper disposition of the case
after conviction (motion for new trial, appeal and collateral attack) is inferior to that of retained counsel.
One of the major objections to the present system is the
defense's lack of funds for independent investigation. Although
almost all answered that the prosecutor made records available to
the appointed attorney, forty per cent replied that the lack of
funds substantially hampers the defense.1 5
Methods employed in determining the truth of an indigency
claim vary from acceptance of the claim in open court to a hearing
and even limited extra-judicial investigation. About ninety per
cent thought that the system is being abused by persons who
could afford counsel. Even so only a few thought it is a common
practice or a serious problem.
15 See the appendix for a tabulation of the questions and answers.
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OBJECTIONS TO THE SySTEM16

Evaluation of the current system of representation for indigents
reveals an urgent need for substantial change. This conclusion is
based on a comparison of the Kentucky system with the present
standards of "due process" and fundamental fairness as well as the
practices in other jurisdictions. Comparing the Kentucky system,
even in its best light, to these standards leads one to the inescapable conclusion that reform is necessary. The result is even clearer
after a review of the unanimous criticism of the bench and bar of
the state.
A. Stage of Proceedingsat Which Counsel is Provided
Though some judges are willing to appoint counsel at anytime
subsequent to arrest this is not the practice: primarily because
17 secondarily because the judge is not
state law does not require it;
usually cognizant of the request for appointment until arraignment. It is submitted that this practice is unsatisfactory. This is
especially true in light of several recent Supreme Court holdings
concerning the right to counsel and equal protection of the law.
The present practice in Kentucky is constitutionally suspect in
both respects.
(1) Right to Counsel.
As thus far interpreted, rule 8.0418 grants an indigent the right
to representation upon arraignment. 19 Such a rule becomes constitutionally questionable upon consideration of several cases. These
cases, beginning with Lisenba v. California,20 and ending with
Escobedo v. Illinois,21 stand for the broad proposition that the
denial of counsel before trial is often the ground for reversing a
conviction on constitutional grounds. Two of these cases, Hamil10 This part will analyze some of the salient weaknesses and strengths of the
present system with reference to the information supplied by the circuit judges, as
well as studies in jurisdictions with comparable problems. See appendix for the
complete tabulation of answers to the questionnaire.
17Ky. Rules Crim. Proc. 2.14, 8.03 [hereinafter cited as RCr]. See notes
7-9 supra and accompanying text for their meaning.
1s RCr 8.04.
19 See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
20 314 U.S. 219 (1941) where denial of counsel at a pre-trial stage so
"prejudiced" the defendant that his subsequent trial was held to be fundamentally
unfair.
21378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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ton v. Alabama2

2

and White v. Maryland2

3

unequivocally state

that the denial of counsel during a "critical stage" of the criminal
proceedings regardless of whether prejudice results from this
denial is unconstitutional and the basis for reversal. 24 It should be
pointed out that in each of these cases the Court did find some
prejudice resulting from the denial. In Hamilton arraignment was
held to be a "critical stage" because it was the only time certain
defenses could be raised. 25 In White the preliminary hearing on
probable cause was held to be a "critical stage" since in that
particular case, evidence was offered and a plea was entered at the
proceeding. 26 The Court did not use "critical stage" language in
Escobedo, but still reversed the murder conviction because of the
admission into evidence of damaging admissions made by the defendant immediately after arrest and subsequent to the time
defendant asked to see his lawyer and was refused. The majority
22 868 U.S. 52 (1961).

878 U.S. 59 (1963) (per curiam).
When one pleads to a capital charge without benefit of counsel, we do not
stop to determine whether prejudice resulted. In this case . . . the degree of
prejudice can never be known. Only the presence of counsel could have enabled
this accused to know all the defenses available to him and to plead intelligently.
Hamilton v. Alabama, 868 U.S. 52, 55 (1961). See also, White v. Maryland, 378
U.S. 59, 60 (1963).
25 868 U.S. at 53-54. However, it is never claimed that the petitioner,
Hamilton, desired to avail himself of these defenses either before or after counsel
was appointed. Taking this omission from the opinion as controlling could lead to
the conclusion that in fact no prejudice existed in the denial.
26 One way to distinguish between the White and Hamilton cases which
lends credence to the pronouncement that no prejudice is necessary if counsel is
denied at a "critical stage" is given in Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect, 49
Minn. L. Rev. 47, at 50-51 (1964) where it is pointed out that in Hamilton counsel
was necesary at arraignment to perform duties traditionally within his Durview, e.g.,
making motions and preserving defenses. It is suggested that in White, "the question concerned the evidentiary use at trial of White's uncounseled plea of guilty
entered at that arraignment, a problem not greatly different from the use at trial
of an uncounseled confession given to police rather than a judge. The use of this
plea did not create a possibility that White might be wrongly or illegally convicted.
The absence of counsel created, rather, a situation where a defendant was convicted who might otherwise have been acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence.
Still the Court reversed the conviction on the ground that White was denied his
sixth amendment right to counsel." Id. at 51. This suggests the problem that confronts many in such cases. That is whether the Escobedo type situation is really a
problem of coerced confession and the holding there of a lefthanded attempt by
the Court to extend the McNabb-Mallory doctrine of the federal courts to the
states. Cf., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) where the majority reversed
on the basis of coerced confession and the four concurrers held the case was
actually a right to counsel problem. Perhaps the problem is merely one of which
type of prophylactic rule is best suited to the states. See, Enker & Elsen, supra
at 53. This same problem has been presented in federal cases. See, Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), although Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
835 (1968), has destroyed any distinction between the two as far as sixth amendment rights are concerned.
23

24
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held that the right to counsel attached as soon as the proceedings
switched from inquisitorial to accusatorial in nature.27 The
28
majority, in peculiar limiting language at the end of the opinion,
29
refused to reverse the prior decisions in Crooker v. California
and Ciceniav. Legay,30 both of which contained strikingly similar
fact situations and both of which resulted in refusals to reverse the
state conviction. In all three cases the defendant asked for a lawyer,
was refused and later made prejudicial statements which were
subsequently used as evidence against him at trial. In light of the
similarity, the majority's refusal to categorize the right to counsel
at arrest as an absolute rule, or put another way its refusal to promote the period immediately following arrest to the status of a
"critical stage" leads to diverse opinion as to what the present
rule is. 31 Justice White, dissenting in Escobedo was of the opinion
that the majority opinion would have to be applied to indigents
without retained counsel regardless of whether they made a request that counsel be appointed. 32 The Kentucky Court of Appeals
has not ruled upon the application of Escobedo to indigents, but
seems to have assumed sub silentio that it did so apply in one case
holding that a request of counsel is necessary before denial is
33
found at the post arrest stage.
27

"We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its locus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confessionour adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the
accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer." 378 U.S. at 485.
2 Id. at 491-92. See Lockhart, Kamisar & Choper, Constitutional Law 39-40
(Supp. 1964).
•357 U.S. 433 (1958).
30 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
31 The potential extensions of the decision are discussed in Enker & Elsen,
supra note 26, at 70-84.
32 378 U.S. 478, at 495.
33 Carson v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 938 (1965). In Carson, the court ruled on a wide variety of issues concerning
appointed counsel. Carson was an indigent arrested for murder. About an hour
after he was arrested he signed a statement without counsel, admitting being
present at the scene of the crime, but claiming that his cohort, Boyd, did the
fatal shooting. Carson later waived examining trial, still without counsel, and
was indicted in less than a week. While in jail awaiting indictment Carson made
another damaging admission to the murder victim's father who was visiting him
in jail. Counsel had not been appointed to represent Carson at this time. Both
statements were admitted against Carson at trial. The facts are clear that both
statements were freely made after Carson had been advised of his right to remain silent. On direct appeal the court held that no error was committed in admitting these statements. In its opinion the court distinguished the Massiah case
because there the statement came after indictment. White and Hamilton were
dismissed as not in point because no "critical stage" had been reached at the
time of the statements. Id. at 92-94. Escobedo was found inapplicable because:
(Continued on next page)
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A more recent case, not involving indigents, seems to qualify
the court's holding in Carson regarding the necessity that counsel
be requested. 34 Though the foregoing survey of the Kentucky cases
interpreting Escobedo leaves something to be desired as far as
setting down a concrete rule, it should be noted that other courts
are not unanimous in their application of that case especially in
deciding whether or not counsel must be requested in order to invoke the rule. 34a It would be mere speculation to predict the
(Footnotes continued from preceding page)

Here it is to be recalled that appellant was affirmatively advised of his right to
remain silent; he was cautioned that any given statement could be used against
him in subsequent prosecution. We have no evidence of appellant's request for
counsel; neither is there evidence that counsel was refused. On the other hand
there is athrmative undisputed evidence that appellant did not request counsel.
We consider these basic factual differences as clearly distinguishing the present
case from Escobedo. Id. at 96.
34 See Scamahorne v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 113, 33 U.S.L.W. 2632
(Ky. May 23, 19t5). Here two men suspected of breaking into an office buiding were arrested at 1:30 a.m. They were held in jail cells until 7:30 a.m. at
which time they were brought out for questioning by two policeman. Apparently
they were not informed of their right to counsel or their right to remain silent.
Brief for Appellant, p. 3. Neither man had counsel at this time yet they admitted the attempted break-in and the possession of burglary tools to the police;
however, they refused to reduce the statements to writing when requested and
then asked to see a lawyer and apparently were refused. They made no further
statements but the voluntary admissions made prior to the request for counsel
were entered into evidence against them. On appeal the court affirmed, after a
finding that the statement was made before the request and that any right to
counsel was waived because anyone intelligent enough to plot a crime in the
manner they did was aware of his right to counsel. Any denial occurring after the
statement was of no moment because nothing prejudicial occurred subsequent to
the request for counsel. It would seem the court should have relied on the fact
that appellants did request counsel without being informed of their rights to find
that counsel was waived during the making of the pre-request statement. Looking at Carson and Scamahorne together we find the rule to be that if the right
to remain silent is made known to the defendant he is held accountable for all
damaging statements he may thereafter make without the benefit of counsel.
Moreover, if the court, by some miraculous process known only to itself, determines
that the accused is of a cerain intelligence he will be held to know of his right
to counsel and to remain mute and that any statements made by the accused
will be admissible. Judging from the language in Scamahorne the Commonwealth
will not have too much of a burden in showing sufficient intelligence on the
part of the accused. Still unanswered of course, is the problem presented in
Escobedo, i.e. when one of sufficient intelligence is denied counsel and thereafter
confesses.
34(a) Although there is probably not much doubt that the principle applies
to indigents as well as those who have retained counsel, controversy rages over
the ingredients necessary to rule out a confession made without the benefit of
counsel. Some courts seem inclined to limit the holding in Escobedo strictly to
the facts of the case. This would require the following in order to strike a confession: (1) the investigation must have become accusatory; (2) the suspect must
be in police custody; (3) the police continue interrogation that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements; (4) the suspect requests and is denied his
opportunity to consult with counsel; (5) the police have not effectively warned
him of his absolute right to remain silent; (6) the suspect makes an incriminating
statement to the police that is subsequently admitted into evidence against him.
(Continued on next page)
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answer to the two questions left unanswered by a solid holding in
these cases. Only time will reveal whether denial of counsel without resulting prejudice at a "critical stage" of the proceedings is
the basis for reversal, and whether the right to counsel attaches
upon arrest in every case making this a "critical stage" in which
denial of counsel would be grounds for exclusion of statements
made by the defendant during the limbo period before counsel is
appointed.
(2)

Equal Protection.

The principles announced in Douglas v. California35 and
3 6 may also operate to strike down the
Griffin v. Illinois
Kentucky
practice on the basis of discrimination between the rich and the
poor criminal defendant. As presently interpreted rule 2.1417
grants an accused the right to consult with retained counsel as
soon as arrested, while rule 8.0438 as interpreted withholds the
indigent's right to consult with counsel until arraignment. 39 On
its face this difference seems to justify the cynical observation of
(Footnotes continued from preceding page)

This seems to be the feeling of many courts especially with respect to the requirement that counsel be requested or that as in Escobedo there is some doubt as to
the voluntariness of the statement. See United States v. Childress, 347 F.2d 448
(7th Cir. 1965); Cephus v. United States, 352 F.2d 633, 33 U.S.L.W. 2674
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Stovall v. Denno, 355 F2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965); United
States ex rel. Conroy v. Pate, 240 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. IM. 1965) (dictum);
Thomas v. Peyton, 240 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Va. 1965); Swartz v. State, 237 Md.
263, 205 A.2d 803 (1965); Sturgis v. State, 235 Md. 343, 201 A.2d 681 (1965);
Commonwealth v. Tracy, 207 N.E.2d 16 (Mass. 1965); Bean v. State, 398 P.2d
251 (Nev. 1965); State v. Scanlon, 84 N.J. Super. 427, 202 A.2d 448 (1964);
State v. McLeod, 1 Ohio St. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 349 (1964); Commonwealth ex rel.
Linde v. Maroney, 416 Pa. 331, 206 A.2d 288 (1965); Commonwealth ex rel.
Storch v. Maroney, 416 Pa. 55, 204 A.2d 263 (1964); Commonwealth v. Coyle v.
Maroney, 416 Pa. 55, 204 A.2d 263; Commonwealth v. Coyle, 415 Pa. 379, 203
A.2d 782 (1964); Commonwealth v. Patrick, 416 Pa. 437, 206 A.2d 295 (1965);
State v. Fox, 131 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1964); Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491,
131 N.W.2d 169 (1964). A smaller number of courts have taken a broader, less
literal view of the case, especially concerning the necessity of requesting counsel.
See Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429, 33 U.S.L.W 2621 (3rd Cir. 1965); United
States ex rel. Rivers v. Myers, 240 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1965); People v. Schrader
P.2d 361 (1965); State v. Mendes, 210 A. 50 (R.I. 1965). Still other courts while
considering the question have not made their interpretation clear. See Wright v.
Dickinson, 336 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1964) (dictum); Davis v. North Carolina,
339 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964); Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir.
1965); People v. Donavan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 193, N.E.2d 628
(1965); Cooper v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 883, 140 S.E.2d 688 (1965).
S35372 U.S. 353 (1963).
30351
U.S. 12 (1956).
3
7 RCr. 2.14.
'3 RCr 8.04.
'19 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Anatole France that "the law in its majestic equality, forbids the
rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the
40
streets, and to steal bread."
Both Griffin and Douglas,while admitting the impossibility of
complete equality of rich and poor,41 held that discriminations
based upon the ability to pay for a trial transcript4 2 and for
counsel 43 were such onerous burdens that they made the right
of an accused to appeal his case meaningless. Rules 3.0244 and
3.0845 require that an arrestee be taken before a committing
magistrate without delay and there be advised of his rights to
consult with counsel. Such pious pronouncements of procedural
safeguards must sound hollow to a person who cannot afford
counsel. Whether or not the "equal protection" principle will
ever be extended to strike down the inequality which the Kentucky practice fosters is subject to debate. 45a However, in view of
the other reasons given for early representation it would seem wise
to eliminate the possibility of such an occurrence.
Constitutional arguments notwithstanding, there are many
practical reasons for demanding representation immediately after
arrest. Although it is true that in some cases delay in appointment
of counsel does not harm the cause of the accused, in many
situations the lack of counsel in earlier phases of the proceedings
operates to prejudice the defendant's rights. 46 One circuit judge
made this comment: "I think every man should have the assistance
of counsel from the moment of his arrest.... The Defender must
40

Cournos, A Modern Plutarch 27.
41 372 U.S. 353, at 356.
4 351 U.S. 12, at 12-13.
43 372 U.S. 353, at 355-58.
44
RCr 3.02.
45

RCr 3.08.

Compare Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some
Field Findingsand Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 59-61 (1963),
with Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants,
47 Minn. L. Rev. 1054, 1067-70 (1963). See also Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 360 (Harlan, J., dissenting). This reasoning does not support an argument that because some defendants, by virtue of their wealth or experience, are
able to avoid legal and just convictions, all defendants, including the indigent and
ignorant, must be given a like opportunity. Such would be a new concept and an
extreme extension of Griffin and Douglas, truly without definable limits. Enker &
Elsen, supra note 26, at 65. But see, Comment, An Historical Argument for the
Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 Yale L.J. 1000, 1034 (1964)
where it is suggested that the inequality is that existing between the defendant
and the state; this seems better classified as a due process argument.
46See e.g., Report of the Atty. Gen'l's Comm. on Poverty & the Administration of Federal justice at 24 (1963).
45a
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be a definite person, immediately available, and not gotten from
some list. Justice is equality, not preference."
Not only are damaging admissions and confessions often made
during this stage, but also the search for evidence and witnesses
becomes more difficult with the passage of time. Even liberal
grants of continuance fail to compensate for this handicap because
the defense attorney is still brought in after the prosecutor has
47
nearly completed his case and evidence is less accessible.
No matter when the constitutional right to appointed counsel
attaches, it would seem desirable to furnish counsel at least as
early as the preliminary hearing before a committing magistrate.
Though the hearing is often waived, evidence can be taken at this
time and so counsel is necessary. He would also be able to advise
the accused on the pros and cons of waiving the examining trial.
Moreover, counsel may be helpful in lowering the amount of bail
demanded as well as in bringing special circumstances to the attention of the prosecutor and the magistrate. Nor would early
representation at either arrest or examining trial necessarily impose an onerous burden on law enforcement officials. California
permits representation by the public defender before the preliminary hearing and this has: "in no way disrupted or adversely affected the orderly prosecution of criminal cases in that state. ' 48
Neither the good intentions of certain circuit judges nor universal acceptance of the foregoing argument will result in an appreciable improvement under the present statutes and rules. This
is because there is no procedure for informing the circuit judge
prior to arraignment. Nor is the power of appointment vested in
anyone else. Moreover, there is no machinery for expediting the
process of contacting an attorney to represent the indigent accused.
B. InadequateRepresentation
Generalizations as to the competency of court appointed attorneys in the forty-nine circuits would be fallacious. Different
judges have expressed various views and no doubt some have
tended to gloss over any inadequancies of counsel in order not to
criticize generally good bars which willingly provide free time.
One judge even expressed his misgivings as to the necessity of
47See e.g., Association of the Bar of the City of N.Y. & N.L.A.D.A., Equal
Justice
4 8 for the Accused at 60 (1959).
Report, supra note 46, at 38.
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counsel: "My grand juries so carefully screen the defendants they
investigate, that there is no real defense to be made." Notwithstanding this evaluation, it seems that most judges realized the
existence of a problem even though many revealed it only in
answers to specific questions dealing with experience, preparation
or performance in comparison to retained counsel. Generally
evaluations have been more favorable than critical and there is no
reason to doubt that this is the case in a significant number of
instances.

(1) Experience.
Some replies reveal that young and inexperienced counsel are
often appointed in all but the most serious cases. Some observers
criticize this because the lack of maturity and experience may result in failure to adequately protect the interests of their clients. 49
One circuit judge said: "Some attorneys have had very little or no
experience in criminal cases, but without exception they do the
best they can and I feel sure that most of the defendants, if not
all, so represented were guilty." (Emphasis added.)
The use of young attorneys is an almost inevitable by-product
of the non-compensatory system. Over half of the judges answering
admitted that assigned counsel is often younger and less experienced than the prosecutor. In forty per cent of the districts previous criminal experience is not a prerequisite to appointment nor
is previous trial experience necessary in thirty per cent. Even if
many inexperienced lawyers compensate for this by zeal and willingness to work, the observation that "whether an indigent under
the present conditions receives excellent or mediocre representation is largely fortuitous," 0 seems to apply to Kentucky.
(2) Preparation.
Only fifteen per cent of the judges rated counsel's preparation
inadequate. However, the opinion of a large majority is that assigned counsel spends less than three hours time preparing in
fifty-six per cent of the cases they handle. It was also estimated
that only fifteen per cent of such cases received more than twelve
hours of outside preparation. The situation is aptly summed up
49 See e.g., Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in
Federal District Courts, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 579, 596 (1963).
5o Id. at 613.
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by one judge who answered: "Assigned counsel do as good a job
during trial as employed counsel but don't spend as much time,
ordinarily, preparingthe case for trial." (Emphasis added.)
Although this is understandable in many instances it is not a
desirable result. Most lawyers realize that results are directly proportional to the amount of time spent in preparing a case.
This defect is made more evident by the fact that assigned
counsel enter more guilty pleas than retained counsel. Although
one judge was of the opinion that any defendant who had a worthwhile defense would somehow manage to hire a lawyer it does not
seem that an orderly system of criminal justice should be based
upon this assumption. Nor does it seem that the rule of "innocent
until proven guilty," is paid much more than lip service when
courts begin to lump all indigents into a category of guilt and then
assume that a guilty plea should necessarily follow.
(3)Post Conviction Representation.
The main complaint made by the judges comparing assigned
counsel to retained counsel concerns the former's performance in
assisting the defendant in achieving the proper disposition of a
case after conviction. One judge said: "If there is weakness in the
present system, it stems from general reluctance, on the part of
assigned counsel, to expend the time and effort to prosecute appeals to the Court of Appeals."
A recent United States Supreme Court decision held: "Where
the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right
are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor." 51
This decision definitely establishes the right to counsel on appeal in Kentucky. Although this was technically the practice even
before Douglas, it seems that counsel often advises against appeal
or in some way discourages his indigent client from seeking further
redress. The most logical reason for this is lack of compensation.
C. Lack of Independent Investigation
Perhaps the main contributing factor to the high number of
guilty pleas and minimal preparation by appointed counsel is the
failure to provide assigned counsel with resources to contest the
51 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
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guilt of the defendant or violations of his constitutional rights.
This was the main objection to the federal court practice which
was analagous in that respect to the practice in Kentucky. 0- More
specifically this criticism is based on the total lack of funds available to assigned counsel to carry on an independent investigation,
hire expert witnesses or utilize modem crime detection resources.
Over one-third of the circuit judges replied that this "substantially" hampers the defense.
This is true even though many prosecutors make records
available to assigned counsel and some also permit the defense to
use their investigatory facilities to some extent. Although it is
impossible to estimate the number of defendants materially injured each of independent investigation, it is evident that the
effect on an individual defendant is devastating when it does take
place.
D. Unfairnessto the Bar
Aside from the foregoing objections to the Kentucky system
it should be noted that the practice of not compensating assigned
counsel is often onerous burden on the members of the bar
and considered by many to be basically unfair. One judge's comment summed up the almost unanimous complaint of his brethren,
when he replied: "It is not "justice" to require an attorney to
spend his own time, talents, and often expenses to represent a
person without compensation. In addition he will probably receive the ire of the opposing parties. In small counties especially
this is important in building a practice." United States Senator
Sam J. Ervin, Jr. of North Carolina echoed these sentiments recently when he said: "The lawyer himself should not fear indigency while defending the indigent. This unfairness to the accused
and hardship on the Bar are intolerable. They are not at all conducive to the efrective administration of justice." 53

Moreover, the legality of the uncompensated system has been
placed in issue recently. In Dillon v. United States,54 the lower
court applied the theory of a governmental taking of the attorney's
services for public use within the meaning of fifth amendment
52

Report, supra note 46, at 26.
Ervin, Uncompensated Counsel: They Do Not Meet the Constitutional
Mandate, 49 A.B.A.J. 435 (1963).
54 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964) rev'd, 346 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1965).
53
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"due process" and awarded the attorney 3,804.54 dollars as just
compensation for his services in representing a prisoner in proceedings under 28 U.S.C. section 2255. This is not the first time
such a question has arisen. In Knox County Council v. State ex.
rel. McCormickrf' a state constitutional provision, "No man's
particular service shall be demanded, without just compensation
.... ,,i5a was interpreted. The court held that the state had no

right to assign counsel without payment and upheld an order
directing the county to pay for respondent's services in defending
an indigent accused of a felony. The court quoted at length from
an earlier opinion.56
E. Conclusion
Nearly all of the deficiencies of the present system stem primarily from the total lack of funds to administer it. Judges are
often reluctant to appoint more experienced members of the bar
without compensation. Investigations must be financed out of the
pocket of the appointed counsel and are therefore sketchy, if conducted at all. Because of lack of compensation, an indigent's attorney may often spend little time on his client's case. Therefore,
guilty pleas result more often in the case of assigned counsel.
Moreover, the ad hoc method of appointment which introduces a
heavy element of chance in the type of representation afforded an
55 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405 (1940).
55(a) Ind. Const. art. I, § 21.
50Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854) which said inter alia: The gratuitous
defence of a pauper is placed upon two grounds, viz., as an honorary duty, even
as far back as the civil law; and as a statutory requirement. Honorary duties are
hardly susceptible of enforcement in a court of law. . . .Under our present
constitution, it [the legal profession] is reduced to where it always should have
been, a common level with all other professions and pursuits.... The practitioner,
therefore owes no honorary services to any other citizen, or to the public....
The idea of one calling enjoying peculiar privileges, and therefore being more
honorable than any other, is not congenial to our institutions. And that any class
should be paid for their particular services in empty honors, is an obsolete idea,
belonging to another age and to a state of society hostile to liberty and equal
rights.
The legal profession having been thus properly stripped of all its odious distinctions and peculiar emoluments, the public can no longer justly demand of that
class of citizens any gratuitous services which would not be demandable of every
other class. To the attorney, his profession is his means of livelihood. His legal
kmmledge is his capital stock. His professional services are no more at the mercy of
the public, as to remuneration, than are the goods of the merchant, or the crops
of the farmer, or the wares of the mechanic. The law which requires gratuitous
services from a particular class, in effect imposes a tax to that extent upon such
class-clearly in violation of the fundamental law, which provides for a uniform
and equal rate of assessment and taxation upon all the citizens. Id at 16-17.
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indigent would be unnecessary if a system of payment were ap57
proved.
IV. ALTERNATIVES To THE PRESENT SYSTEM
All of the suggested alternatives to the present system provide
for compensation of an indigent defendant's attorney. While these
would remedy the main defect of the Kentucky system other deficiences exist and should, if possible, be likewise eliminated. Each
system in some way, provides for the other problems. It is suggested that certain guidelines should be set down before adopting
58

any system.

Each of the following systems will be analyzed with A.B.A.
principles in mind.
A. Payment of Assigned Counsel
Forty states have statutory provisions for payment of court appointed private counsel in criminal cases. 59 Although five of these
57 See Beaney, The Right to Counsel: Past, Present & Future, 49 Va. L. Rev.
1150 (1963).
58 The National Legal Aid and Defender Association and the American Bar
Association have adopted a set of principles which described these guidelines:
1. Provide counsel for every indigent person unable to employ counsel
who faces the possibility of deprivation of his liberty or other serious
criminal sanction;
2. Afford representation which is experienced, competent and zealous;
3. Provide the investigatory and other facilties necessary for a complete
defense;
4. Come into operation at a sufficiently early stage of the proceedings
so as to fully advise and protect the defendant;
5. Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client;
6. Include the taking of appeals and the prosecuting of other remedies,
before or after conviction, considered by the defending counsel to be in
the interest of justice;
7. Maintain in each county in which the volume of criminal cases requiring assignment of counsel is such as to justify the employment of at
least one full-time lawyer to handle the work effectively, a defender
office, either as a public office or as a quasi-public or private organization;
8. Enlist community participation and responsibility and encourage the
continuing cooperation of the organized bar. N.L.A.D.A., Guidelines for
Adequate Defense Systems 8 (1964).
59
Ala. Code tit. 15, § 318 (1958); Alaska Crim. R. 39 (b) (1963); Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 13-1673 (1956); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2415 (Repl. vol. 1964) (at the
discretion of any county with less than 100,000 population); Calif. Penal Code §
9,97: Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-31-9 (1963); Ga. Code Ann. § 27-3001 (Sunn.
1963); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 253-5 (Supp. 1963); Idaho Code Ann. § 19-1513
(1947); M1l.Ann. Stat., ch. 38, § 118-3 (Smith-Hurd 1964); Ind. Stat. Ann. §
9-1314-2409 (Sumo. 1964); Iowa Code Ann. § 775.5 (Supp. 1964); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 62-1304 (1964); Me. Rev. Stat Ann., ch. 15, § 810 (1964); Md. Rule of
Ct. 719 (1963); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 276, § 37A (Supp. 1964); Mich. Comp.
Laws § 775.16-18 (Supp. 1963); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 611.07 (1964); Miss. Code

(Continued on next page)
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statutes apply only to capital cases,60 the rest also apply to less
serious crimes. 60a
These statutes are by no means uniform except to the extent
that the manner of choosing the appointee is within the sole discretion of the trial judge. 61 While on its face such discretion
seems necessary, it is suggested that a more specific statutory
method is desirable for two reasons: (1) the present practice is
too haphazard, and for that reason the appointee is often no match
for the prosecutor; (2) the recent decision in Escobedo v. llinois,52 discussed in part I may demand that counsel be appointed
immediately after arrest and the present system seems inadequate
to process such appointments.
(1) The first objection is based on the possibility that the
practice resulting therefrom will permit retention of some of the
objectional features of uncompensated appointment. For example,
younger, less experienced attorneys will still be the logical choice
(Footnotes continued from preceding page)

Ann. § 2505 (1957); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-6513 (Supp. 1963); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 29-1803 (Cum. supp. 1963); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 7.206 (1963); N. H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 604:3 (Supp. 1963); N.J. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2A:163-1 (1953); N.M.
Stat. Ann § 41-11-3 (Repl. vol. 1964) N.Y. Code Crim Proe.§308; N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15-4.1 (Supp. 1963); N.D. Cent. Code § 29-01-27 (1960); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2941.51 (Page supp. 1964); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22 § 1271 (1958); Ore.
Rev. Stat. § § 133.635, 135.330 (1953); Pa Stat. Ann. tit. 19 § 784-784.5 (1964);
S.D. Code § 34.1901 (1939); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 484 (a) (Supp. 1964);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 6503 (Supp. 1963), tit. 2 A pp. II Rule 45 (1958); Va.
Code Ann. § 14.1-184 (Supp. 1964); Wash. Rev. Code Ann § 10.01.110 (1961);
W. Va. Code Ann. § 6190 (1961); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 957.26 (Supp. 1965); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 7-9 (1957). This list does not include those states having a mandatory public defender system which also have statutes providing for compensation
to assigned counsel in special cases. See e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-81 (Supp.
1963).
GO
Ga. Code Ann. § 27-3001 (Supp. 1963); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 276 §
37A (Supp. 1963); Miss Code Ann. § 2505 (1957); N.J. Rev. Stat. Ann 2A:163-1
(1953); N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 308.
0
The remaining statutes apply to "senious non-capital crimes." Ala. Code
T(a)
tit. 15, § 318 (1958) (felonies); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1073 (1956) (misdemeanors); Calif. Pen. Code § 987; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 611.07 (1964) (crimes and
insanity proceedings); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1803 (Cum. supp. 1963) (felonies
and gross misdemeanors); N. D. Cent. Code § 29-01-27 (1960) (any offense
punishable by imprisonment); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 604:3 (Supp. 1963) (all
criminal actions); W. Va. Code Ann. § 6190 (1961) (juvenile court proceedings).
61 See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann § 2941.50 (Page supp. 1964): [T]he
accused shall be brought into court, and if he is without and unable to employ
counsel, the court shall assign him counsel, not exceeding two, who shall have
access to such accused at all reasonable hours. Such counsel shall not be a partner
in the practice of law of the attorney having charge of the prosecution. A partner
of the atorney having charge of the prosecution shall not be employed by or
conduct the defense of the person so prosecuted.
62.,378 U.S. 478 (1964). See also notes 21-34 supra and accompanying text.
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of the trial judge in many instances. Even if older, more experienced members of the bar are appointed there is no guarantee
that these men will be experienced in criminal proceedings. 3 The
presumption that all persons licensed to practice are competent to
handle all legal matters is refuted every day.64
This criticism does not assume that inexperience in criminal
work is an automatic indicia of incompetency. Indeed many instances of exceptional service by young lawyers and men who
rarely practice criminal law can be pointed out. Young attorneys
are often more enthusiastic than their more experienced brethren.
Futhermore, the actual practice in many courts might assure effective counsel for each case. Nevertheless, the problem under
consideration is how to best establish a systematic and consistent
guarantee of effective counsel and the present system often fails in
this respect. Studies of compensated assigned counsel systems in
two states support this criticism. 5
(2) Depending upon future interpretations of the federal
constitution the precedent of Escobedo v. IllinoisyG may well mean
that counsel must be provided upon arrest whether or not it is
specifically requested. Moreover, denial of an indigent's request for
counsel at this time is very possibly a violation of "equal protection
of the law" because of rule 2.14.7

In any event the standards of the A.B.A. demand early representation for indigents. 8
Another advantage of early representation is the chance it gives
63 See Cuff, Public Defender System: The Los Angeles Story, 45 Mim. L.
Rev. 715, 723 (1961).
64

David, Institutionalor Private Counsel, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 753, 760 (1961).

05 See Kamisar & Choper, supra note 45a, at 107. Two of the seven district

judges in this group (a representative interview) emphatically reported that appointed lawyers compare unfavorably with retained lawyers. One said flatly that
many indigents do not receive adequate representation.' Both maintained that,
with some exceptions, the appointed lawyers don't put as much into investigation.
...
A third district judge acknowledged that appointed lawyers were generally
less experienced than retained counsel.
A California study of counties with a paid assigned counsel system revealed
similar results: Young attorneys comprise a large percentage of assigned counsel.
. . . However, young attorneys are seldom a match for the prosecutor. Their
diligence and enthusiasm sometimes lead to unnecessary trials, and they lack
knowledge of when it is in the client's best interest to compromise and plead guilty
to a lesser included offense. Note, Representation of Indigents in California, 13
Stan. L. Rev. 522, at 536 (1961).
66378 U.S. 478 (1964).
67
RCr. 2.14 (1963). See notes 36-48 supra and accompanying text.
68 See supra note 58.

GMEON's

Tn-zmpr

the defendant's attorney to gather evidence while it is still fresh
and more accessible. Police often have a distinct advantage in investigation because of their superior facilities. The defendant's
added handicap of waiting several days before gathering facts is
just one more inequality hampering the realization of a true adversary proceeding.
If earlier representation is to be the law the present system is
not adequate to provide for early representation. The trial judge
is not always available to receive a plea of indigency before arraignment. Even if he is, indigency would have to be determined
and a lawyer contacted following that before representation could
begin. Considering the size of and the number of counties in
many of the judicial circuits in Kentucky,G9 this would be an
entirely unworkable system. It would also increase the burden on
the already harried circuit judge.
Since both of these problems stem from the lack of some system
of appointment, it would seem that a provision for setting up appointment machinery on the county level would provide an adequate alternative. This system could empower the local bar to
compile a list of qualified criminal practitioners to represent indigents. One or two of these attorneys could be designated as the
appointee for a period of time. It would also be incumbent upon
the police to notify the accused of his right to counsel (whenever it may attach) and if he requests representation, but claims
indigency, to further notify him of the attorney designated to
handle such cases. Of course, this does allow for possible false
claims of indigency at the early stage. The local attorney-designate
would often be able to determine the verity of the plea. If it were
later discovered that the accused was not qualified to claim indigency the court could then order him to reimburse the state or
the county for services rendered. A system of choosing only qualified attorneys need not put an end to the obvious practical value
of training young lawyers through indigent defense work. Many
state statutes allow the appointment of two attorneys in the discretion of the judge.70 There is no reason why this provision could
not be utilized to continue training your attorneys. Perhaps a
a distinction could be made to provide for lesser compensation in
GO
See appendix, infra.
70 See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 27-3001 (Supp. 1962).
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the younger attorney's case. Another suggestion is that young attorneys seeking criminal experience, volunteer their services as a
second attorney. Appointment in the manner suggested, although
providing a qualified attorney at an early stage of the proceedings,
need not be final. In other words the circuit judge could change
the assignment at arraignment or before if he wishes. Should the
list drawn by the local bar association prove inadequate the circuit
judge could prepare his own list and designate the attorney to be
called by the indigent accused for a period of time. Either method
would do much to solve the deficiencies of present assigned counsel
systems.
With these deficiencies corrected the basically sound system of
compensating assigned counsel would do much to improve the
Kentucky system. Providing sufficient compensation will make
assignment more attractive to members of the bar. Judges will be
less reluctant to call upon attorneys experienced in criminal
practice. Moreover, independent investigation, within reason, can
be made by the appointed defense counsel. Also an appointed attorney will feel obligated to devote more time to preparing the
indigent's case when he is paid.
B. Public Defender System
Fourteen states have some statutory provision for a public
defender system.7 1 The establishment of such a system is a more
radical departure from the traditional system of appointed counsel
than mere compensation, yet the jurisdictions which have adopted
the public defender system seem convinced of its superiority.72
Public defenders are salaried employees of the state or county
whose primary function is to represent indigent persons accused
of crimes.73 Depending upon the number of cases a public defender must handle, the office is either full time or part time.
71lAriz. Rev. Stat. Ann § 11-581 to 586 (Supp. 1964); Cal. Covt. Code §
2770-27711; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-21-1 to 13 (Supp. 1963); Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § § 54-80 to 811a (Sump 1964); Del. Code Ann. tit 29, § 2601 (Supp.
1964); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 27.50-.58 (Supp. 1964); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 34, § 5601
(Supp. 1964); Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 9-3501 to 3503, 13-140 to 1406 (1960); Mass.
Cen. Laws Ann. ch. 221, § § 34C-D (1960); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 611.13 (Supp.
1964); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1804 (Cum. supp. 1963); Ore. Rev. Stat. § § 138.710
to .790 (Cum. supp. 1963); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § § 12-15-1 to 11 (Supp. 1964);
Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-13 (Supp. 1964).
72 See Kamisar & Choper, supra note 45a, at 110-17; Note, 13 Stan. L. Rev.
522 (1961).
7"'The attorney so appointed shall be known as the public defender. He

(Continued on next page)
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The principle advantage of a public defender system is that
it provides representation by lawyers who have developed substantial experience in criminal work. A full time public defender
is more able to concentrate on criminal matters and should be
better informed of changes in criminal law than most appointed
counsel. It is also suggested that public defenders are better equipped to serve criminal defendants because of their obvious desire
to do this type of work. In contrast many lawyers, regardless of
their willingness to serve as assigned counsel, are not interested in
criminal work. In addition the public defender is likely to be well
acquainted with, and respected by, both the judge and the prosecutor, and may therefore be able to obtain more equitable sentences for those defendants who plead guilty. It would also seem
that a public defender office should be able to perform investigatory work more efficiently and economically than assigned counsel.
Another obvious advantage of the public defender system is that
counsel will always be available, thus ensuring early representation
for the indigent and eliminating delays which occur when individual private appointments are being worked out. With a public
defender, the court need not expend time and effort to obtain
counsel, and therefore cases could be more speedily concluded.
The public defender of Los Angeles County, California pointed
out that the system gives "increased confidence in, and respect for
the law. . . . ,74This seems true since many persons become bitter
upon arrest, with the realization that the vast, seemingly one-sided
machinery of the state has been set into motion against them. Mr.
Cuff also suggests, in the same article, that the public defender
system provides for a speedier and more effective adminstration
of justice at a lower cost to the public.
There have been several objections made to the public defender system. These criticisms stem from conceptual as well as
practical arguments. One complaint is that the government would
be playing inconsistent roles under such a system. This fails to
(Footnotes continued from preceding page)

shall appear for and defend all persons charged with a felony or gross misdemeanors when it shall appear to the court that the person accused is unable, by
reason of poverty, to procure counsel." Minn. Stat. Ann. § 611.18(2) (Supp.
1961). Some statutes provide for the defender to handle non criminal matters if
he deems it necessary. See, e.g., Cal. Govt. Code § 27706(c) (d) (to collect wages
and defend against unjust civil harrassment).
74 Cuff, Public Defender System: The Los Angeles Story, 45 Minn. L. Rev.
712, 721 (1961).
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take into consideration the affirmative duty of the state to guarantee "equal protection of the laws .. .."75 Indeed the Kentucky
Court of Appeals once held that the Attorney General could
represent a defendant in a criminal trial.76 State government is
too large and too complex to justify treating all of its employees
as members of the same group.7 7 Circuit judges and common-

wealth attorneys are both state employees yet that does not mean
that the connection is sufficient to give them a common interest
78
beyond that of achieving justice.
Other objections raised seem more conjectual than real, yet
they deserve consideration. Some critics argue that it would be difficult to obtain able public defenders. In addition, it is said that a
public defender would handle too many cases and therefore tend
to categorize them; and as a result his work would lack zeal and
originality. Opponents also claim that the public defender will
become too friendly with the prosecutor and judge and thus
manipulate trades whereby the defender might obtain favorable
treatment for one defendant at the expense of another.7 9 The short
answer to these criticisms is that they have not been realized in
practice. A critique of the system in Minnesota states:
[T]he six district judges interviewed . . . as well as the

respective county attorneys, unanimously rejected the antidefender arguments. Their attitude was well summed up by
one judge: The public defender is zealous. The fact that the
defender is paid out of the public treasury is irrelevant. So are
judges. That he may deal frequently with the prosecutor has
no more significance than the fact that personal injury
specialists, who often meet in trial, may be good friends. But
this doesn't affect their courtroom performance. In a sense it
may make them8 0even more competitive. They want the other
fellow's respect.
Another objection is that the office might become too involved
in politics. This of course, depends solely upon the method of
naming the defender and will be explored in detail below. SufU.S. Const

amend. XIV.
76
Sharp's Adm'x v. Kirkendall, 25 Ky. 150 (1820).
77
See Note, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 579, 604 (1963) (federal
78
75

See, 42 A.B.A.J. 712 (1956) (federal analogy).
79See Stewart, The Public Defender's System is

analogy).

Unsound in Principle, 32
J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 115 (1948). But see, Baker, The Public Defenders Work in
Cook8 0County, 25 J. Crim. LJ. 5, 8 (1934).
Kamisar & Choper, supra note 45a, at 112 (1963).
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fice it to say here that sufficient legislative safeguards can be set
up to alleviate most political pressures on the office.
Perhaps the most meaningful problem posed by the objectors
is the so-called "impracticality" of establishing public defender
offices in many of the state's sparsely populated counties. No doubt
it would be financially unfeasible in many instances on a county
basis. However, there is no reason why the system must be
established on a county basis or that the office need be a full time
one. A practical system could be set up by establishing an office
for an entire judicial district, in some instances, on a part time
basis. A study of such systems under comparative conditions will
be presented below.
This brief survey of the pros and cons of the public defender
system has not answered all of the questions that might be posed.
The system is not perfect. However, the most serious objections to
it are theoretical and largely unrealized. Moreover, jurisdictions
with the system have found it far superior to other alternatives.8 '
C. Voluntary Defender System
This type of system varies from the public defender system
by virtue of the fact that it is in no way controlled or supported
by state or local government. Voluntary defender offices are found
in some of our larger cities and perform services much the same
as public defender offices. The lawyers and investigators are paid
from charitable contributions. Philadelphia's Voluntary Defender
Association is a member of the United Fund. Properly staffed
voluntary defender organizations can conceivably provide the same
services as their public counterpart, and according to one proponent of the voluntary systems, they are more advantageous:
I believe that a perfect system of providing representation to
indigent persons accused of crime cannot be devised. While the
Public Defender system, entirely supported by tax funds, can
provide comprehensive coverage and investigation facilities
equal to that of the prosecution, the Defender is susceptible to
political manipulation and domination by the court. I believe
that the voluntary defender system is in the best position to
afford independent representation and a 'competent admini81 Trebach, New England Defender Systems, 47 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 170, 174
(1964); Cuff, 45 Mim. L. Rev. 715; David, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 753 (1961).
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stration of justice to the needy' and therefore is preferable to
the Public Defender system. A voluntary defender is not
hemmed in by statutory limitations and political pressures and
is in a better position to stand his ground before a tyrannical
judge or an arbitrary public official. One real test of evaluation of any defender system is whether the system protects
the legal rights of an unpopular defendant. It seems to me that
the vountary defender system supervised by a responsible
Board of Directors composed of leading members
of the legal
2
profession is better able to meet this test.
The main difficulty of this type of system is the limited funds
it has and its absolute reliance upon charity. The Philadelphia Association is admittedly hampered in the depth of coverage it of83
fers for these reasons.
The same writer also agrees that such a system is impractical
for sparsely populated areas.8 4 It is more suited to large metropolitan areas as evidenced by the fact that voluntary defender
organizations are found only in large cities.8 5 This, of course, is
primarily because of lack of funds. Without public support such a
system would be extra-statutory and, therefore, not a subject of
legislation, but only of suggestion.
D. Public-PrivateDefender System
This is a hybrid of the public and voluntary defender systems
and is in operation in only a few cities. Under this system the
control of the defender's office is in the hands of a private board,
but supported by an annual governmental appropriation. Such a
system supposedly retains the best features of its derivatives while
ridding itself of the biggest deficiencies of both. Ideally the pitfalls of political dominance and financial insecurity are avoided
while autonomy is attained.
Such systems are in use in Washington, D. C., s 1 Buffalo and
Rochester.8 7 The District of Columbia's legal aid agency is established by statute, governed by a private board of trustees and sup8
2 Pollack, Equal Justice in Practice, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 787, 747-48 (1961).
For a comprehensive survey of the voluntary Defender Association of Philadelphia,
see Note, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 812 (1959).
83 See Pollack, supra note 82, at 748.
84 Id. at 747-49.
85

E.g., Cleveland, New York and Philadelphia.
8OD.C. Code Ann. §§ 2-2201-10 (1961).
87 Note, supra note 82, at 820.

19661

GIDEON'S TRuMPET

ported by federal grants. It is not an all inclusive agency though
and private counsel are often asked to volunteer to supplement the
existing staff.8s It is possible that such a system could function as
efficiently as any other suggested. However, it would seem desirable only if it is found that governmental control is sufficiently
obnoxious to an effective system of representation, and so far no
such showing has been made. If installed in Kentucky, control
could be placed in a non-governmental board of trustees in each
of the 49 judicial districts. Such a diffusion of policy making power
would predictably lead to non-uniformity. In the alternative, perhaps policy making power could be placed in a single body on a
statewide basis.
V. THE ALTERNATIVES IN PRACTICE s9

A. Public Defender Systems
(1) Methods of Filling the Office.
Twelve of the fourteen state statutes provide for appointment
of the public defender. The justices of the superior court of Connecticut appoint the defenders for each county.90 In Illinois, 91
Indiana 92 and Minnesota 3 the judges of the court of the circuit
94
or district, appoint the defender for that district. Massachusetts
and Oregon 95 have created special committees, appointed by the
high court, to appoint the public defender and thereby, supposedly take the office out of politics. The governors of Rhode
Island and Delaware appoint the public defender with the advice
and consent of the senate,9 6 while Arizona and Colorado permit
S8Note, supra note 49, at 595.
89 This part is primarily a survey of the various statutory implementations and
non-statutory practices of the various systems discussed in part IV, supra. Answers
to problems peculiar to Kentucky will be suggested by analyses of certain law
and practice. The bulk of this part is devoted to the various public defender
systems because they are more subject to statutory regulation. Some problems
such as determining indigency and the types of cases for which counsel is provided
are the same, regardless of the system, and therefore will only be covered in the
section on public defenders. The other two sections-compensated assignment and
voluntary defenders-will deal only with questions peculiar to that particular
mode of representation.
00 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-80 (Supp. 1963).
91 nM. Ann. Stat. ch. 34, § 5602 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
92 nd. Ann. Stat. § 9-3501 (RepI. vol. 1963).
93 Minn. Stat Ann. § 611.13 (Supp. 1964).
94
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. cb. 221, §34c (Supp. 1964).
05 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.780 (Cum. supp. 1961).
90
Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 2602 (Supp. 1964); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §
12-15-2 (1956).
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the local governing body to select the defender.", The California
statutes leave the method of choosing the defender up to the
county availing itself of the system. 97 Only in Florida9 8 and
Nebraska99 is the office filled by popular election.
(2) Requirements.
Most of the statutes are silent on the requirements for the
office, although states providing for appointment by a committee
or the bench generally provide that the appointing bodies may
make appropriate rules and policies concerning the office. Rhode
Island has the most stringent prerequisite-ten years practice as an
attorney.10 0 The Connecticut statute requires five years practice
and residence in the state.1 1 The statewide defender in Indiana
must have practiced for three years10 2 while the Illinois law provides only that he be a "duly licensed attorney .... ,103
(3) Term of Office and Replacement.
The states with elective offices (Florida and Nebraska) have
four year terms, as does Indiana. 0 4 Rhode Island's statute provides
for a three year term' 0 5 while Connecticut's statute provides for
yearly appointment. 10 6 The Illinois defender holds office at the
pleasure of the appointing court. 07 Colorado apparently has given
the local government complete discretion with regard to the
terms 08 while the Massachusetts committee can remove for
cause. 109 Most states do not provide for interim appointment to
the office.
(4) Salary.
Salary provisions are likewise not uniform. Connecticut provides that it shall not be less than one-half of the salary of the
96(a) Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-582 (Supp. 1964); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §

39-21-1 (Supp. 1964).
97Cal. Govt. Code § 27701.
98Fla. Stat. Ann. § 27.50 (Supp. 1963).
99

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1804 (Cum.Supp. 1963).

100 See statutes cited note 96 supra.
101 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann § 54-80 (Supp. 1963).
2
10 Ind. Ann. Stat. § 13-1401 (Supp. 1963).
103111. Ann. Stat. ch. 34, § 5601 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
104 Ind. Ann. Stat. § 13-1401 (Repl. vol. 1963).
105 See statutes cited note 96 supra.
106 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-80 (Supp. 1963).
107Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 34, § 5602 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
10 8 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-21-2 (Supp. 1964).
109 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 221, § 34D (Supp. 1964).
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county attorney in the same county with the exact amount being
set by the county. 110 California permits the county to fix the
amount."' Illinois has a complex scale to be followed by each
county according to population." 2 The Indiana courts fix their
defenders' salaries with a ceiling of 10,000 dollars per year."

2

1

Minnesota follows the same practice with a maximum of 8,600
dollars per year." 3 The statutory salary in Rhode Island is 6,500
dollars" 4 per year while the defender in Oregon is guaranteed a
salary between 12,500 dollars and 14,500.115 These are the only
statutory provisions, but additional information is contained in
sub-section ten of this section.
(5) Expenses.
Almost all of the public defender legislation provides for
reasonable clerical and investigatory expenses to be approved by
n
the court or the county board after an itemized accounting.l 5a
(6) Assistants.
Connecticut and Nebraska provide for assistants to be appointed
by the public defender in the more populous counties of the
state."( The county defenders in Florida, and the state defender in
Oregon are empowered by statute to appoint assistants." 7 The
Rhode Island statute provides for one assistant to be paid 3,000
dollars a year.118 In Illinois the court must approve the number of
of appointed assistants."19 The Massachusetts act provides that the
appointing committee may employ such professional help as is
necessary. 120 Of course, in all of these jurisdictions the appointment of assistants is contingent upon approval of the governmental
body which appropriates his salary.
110 Conn.

Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-80 (Supp. 1963).

Ill Cal. Govt. Code § 27711.
112 M1.Ann. Stat. ch. 34, § 5605 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
112a Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3502 (Repl. vol. 1963).
1'G Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.750 (Cum. supp. 1961).
114 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-15-5 (1956).
11; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.750 (Cum. supp. 1961).
115a E.g., R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-15-7 (1956).
1
6 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-80a (Supp. 1963); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1804
(Cum.
Supp. 1963).
117
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 27.53 (Supp. 1963); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.760 (Cum.
Supp. 1963).
118 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-15-6 (1956).

"9111. Ann. Stat. ch. 34, § 5606 (Smith-Hurd 1964).

120 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 221 § 34D (Supp. 1964).
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(7) Duties of Defender.
The different systems make the public defender available for
various types of litigation at different stages of the proceedings.
Most provide for utilization of the defender at the pre-trial and
trial levels while others use the defender only for appeals and posttrial proceedings. The Connecticut statute permits the defender to
act on behalf of indigents in any preliminary or committing hearing as well as the trial on criminal charges in either the superior
or common pleas courts. 121 Illinois provides for appointment of
the public defender before a plea is entered for defendants in any
court of record with general criminal jurisdiction. 22 Indiana provides for representation by a public defender at trial and on
appeal. 2

3

The Minnesota statute provides the public defender to

all indigents charged with felonies or gross misdemeanors. 2 4 He
may also appear before the pardon and parole boards upon approval of the court. 12 5 Indigents accused of any crime punishable

by a prison term are represented by the public defender in
Nebraska. 26 There, however, only in capital cases does the public
defender practice on the appellate level. 2 7 The Rhode Island

statute provides defender representation for those cases referred
to the defender by the superior court. 128 Massachusetts has a more
flexible statute, making the defender available "at any stage of a
criminal proceeding, other than capital . . . [in which counsel is
required] ."129 The Oregon scheme is quite complex but it appears

that assigned counsel are used for all trial work as well as automatic appeals, while the public defender is used for other appeals,
but not habeas corpus proceedings. 130 California's system calls for
representation within forty-eight hours after arrest through ap131
peal.
121 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-80 (Supp. 1963). Accord, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 11-584 (Supp. 1964).

Ann. Stat. ch. 34, § 5604.
Ind. Ann. Stat. § § 9-3501, 13-402 (Repl. vol. 1963).

122 I.

123

124 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 611.13 (Supp. 1964).

125
Ibid.
126 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1804 (Cum. Supp. 1963).
127 Ibid.
2
1 8 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-15-3 (1956).
129 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 221, § 34D (Supp. 1964). The Colorado statute
is similar. "Counsel and defend him, whether he is held in custody or charged
with a criminal offense, at every stage of the proceedings following arrest.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-4 (1963). Accord, Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 2604 (Supp.
1964).
130 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.770 (Cum. supp. 1963).
'3' Cal. Cov't Code § 27706.
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It has been suggested that a defender office be established to
handle appellate work exclusively while the local defenders handle
all of the trial court cases (horizontal structure). Some disagree
with this system on the ground that the lawyer at the trial level is
more familiar with the case and therefore better equipped to
handle an appeal (vertical structure). Neverthless, Indiana has
installed the horizontal system on the theory that appellate and
trial practice are separate specialties better handled by experts.

3 2

California and Nebraska each have statutory provisions permitting the public defender to represent indigents suing to collect wages less than 100 dollars as well as those who are being unduly harrassed in civil litigation. 133 California also provides for
representation at all proceedings for pardons and restoration of
134
civil rights.
(8) Determination of Indigency.
The statutory definitions of indigency are very general, and
the methods for determination of the status were not drafted with
an eye toward mathematical exactness. Rhode Island and Florida
have the most stringent provisions for determining indigency
although the broad language of the statutes in other jurisdictions
seems sufficient to permit adequate investigation into the financial
status of the claimant. Rhode Island defines an indigent as, including a person who does not have property or source of income
to furnish him a living nor anyone able to support him to whom
36
he is entitled to look for support."' 135 The Rhode Island statute'
calls for a confidential financial affidavit to be submitted to notify
the court if he thinks the claimant has failed to qualify as an indigent. 137 Insolvency is the measure of indigency in Florida for
purposes of representation by the public defender. 138 It is determined by the court after a hearing. The Florida law further pro132 hnd. Ann. Stat. § § 13-401-402 (Repl. vol. 1963). Other states permit the
local defender to prosecute appeals. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-21-4 (Supp.

1964).33

1 Cal. Gov't Code § 27706(b); Neb. Rev. Stat § 29-1804 (Cum. supp.
1964).
134 Cal. Gov't Code § 27706(c). See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-3 (1963) which
permits the defender to act in delinquency cases and misdemeanors as well as
municipal code violations.
135 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-15-8 (Supp. 1964).
1386 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-15-10 (Supp. 1964).
137 Ibid.
18 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 27.51 (Supp. 1963).
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vides that the court, upon the motion of the state attorney, may,
within a year, show that insolvency was wrongly claimed and ask
the court to assess the party with the costs of his defense. 139 Anyone defended by a Florida defender has a lien created against him
40
and his estate, by operation of law, for the cost of his defense.1
(9) Full or Part Time Defender.
Only three state statutes make any mention of whether the
public defender may engage in private practice. It would seem that
this would be determined by the number of criminal cases he
must handle and the salary he is paid. The Florida statute states
that the defender has a primary obligation to fulfill the duties of
his office before taking on private cases and that in no instance can
he engage in private criminal practice.' 4 ' The California statute
makes it a full time job in counties of certain size. 142 Oregon provides that any defender or deputy making more than 10,000 dollars per year cannot engage in private practice. 143
It is suggested that except in the most populous districts of
Kentucky the only practical way to maintain a public defender
system would be to create the office on a part time basis, allowing
the defender to engage in private practice exclusive of other
criminal work, in order to assure that the question of fees is never
an issue.
Although fourteen states have statutes providing for public defender offices all of these jurisdictions do not have such offices in
every judicial district. California and some other states permit local
option, by county or district between paid assigned counsel and
public defender systems. 1 44 Only Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Massachusetts and Rhode Island have mandatory public defender
systems for trial work. 145 The other states have mandatory or
optional provisions for areas with a certain population. For in189 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 27.52 (Supp. 1963). Accord, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3501

(Repl. 0vol. 1963).
14 Fla. Stat Ann. § 27.56 (Supp. 1963).
141 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 27.51 (Supp. 1963).
142 Cal.

Gov't. Code § 27705. See explanation Note, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 522

(1961).

143 Ore. Rev. Stat § 138.740(5) (Cum. supp. 1963).
144 Cal. Govt. Code § 27700; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-2 (1963).
45
1 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-80 (Supp. 1963); Del. Code Ann. tit 29, §

2602 (Supp. 1964); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 27.50 (Supp. 193); Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 221, § 34D (Supp. 1964); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-15-3 (1956).
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stance any county in Illinois with over 35,000 persons has a mandatory public defender. 146 Any Indiana county with a population
ranging from 110,000 to 175,000 may establish a public defender
office. 147 Only counties with more than 240,000 people are eligible
in Minnesota,147a while in Nebraska a county with more than
200,000 inhabitants has a mandatory public defender. 48 Less
populous Nebraska counties may employ the system. 149 The public
defender in Oregon is a statewide officer who does not handle trial
work.10 The Virginia statute provides for a public defender in
cities with a population of 100,000 to 160,000 and in any county
having between 57,000 and 65,000 population which adjoins a city
having a population of 230,000, or in any county with a density
of population greater than 4,000 people per square mile.' 5'
(Virginia's cities are not part of her counties).
A study of the California system reveals that public defenders
are employed in extremely rural areas as well as urban centers.
The counties of Inyo and Yuba with populations of 11,684 and
33,859, respectively, have part time public defenders. 52 These
smaller counties, with part time defenders, face a problem because private practice may vie for their attention. Where his salary
is low there is a natural tendency for the defender to slight indigent cases in favor of more lucrative private practice. This need
not occur if appropriate salaries are provided and defenders are
responsible to some authority, preferably non-political, for their
behavior in office.

53

(10) Cost of Maintaining a System.
Figures are not available for the actual cost of maintaining defender systems in most of the states. This writer has been able to
secure a fragmentary financial reports from California, Connecticut, Florida and Massachusetts.
146 1. Ann. Stat. ch. 34, § 5601 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964).
147 Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3501 (Repl. vol. 1963).

147a Minn. Stat. Ann. § § 611.12-.13 (Supp. 1964). This includes only two
counties.
148 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1804 (Gum. supp. 1963).
Ibid.
100 Ore. Rev. Stat § 138.770 (Cum. supp. 1961).
'49

151Va. Code Ann. § § 19.1-12-13 (Supp. 1964). See, Manson The Indigent
in Virginia, 51 Va. L. Rev. 163 (1965).

Apparently there are no defenders in

Virginia.
152 Note, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 522 (1961).
163 Note, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 522 (1961) passim.
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a. California'54

Since California has a local (county) option system the figures
should prove invaluable in relation to Kentucky because although
many of the counties with public defender offices are in huge
metropolitan areas, some are in rural counties. Six counteis, fairly
representative of the size of Kentucky's judicial districts, 155 are
analyzed here. The Stanford study implies that all of these offices,
except Sacramento, are part time. It should also be remembered
that the average attorney's fee and salary in California is probably
higher than in Kentucky.
b. Connecticut
For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1963 public defenders
handled 1,310 felony and serious misdemeanor cases in trial court,
at a total cost of 63,947 dollars or an average cost of 43.72 dollars
per defendant. 156 Public defenders are assigned on a county basis
in Connecticut. Three counties with populations of over 650,000
have two public defenders each, with assistants. The remaining
five counties, including three with populations of between 68,000
and 88,000, have one public defender, probably a part time
officer.
c. Massachusetts
The total budget for all of the activites of the Massachusetts
Defender Committee during the 1962-63 fiscal year was 87,742
dollars. 157 This is remarkably low for a commonwealth of over
5,000,000 people. The sum represents the full time salaries of the
chief counsel for the entire system, seven attorneys in the Boston
office, six part time public defenders operating outside of
metropolitan Boston as well as other expenses. 158
It should be remembered that both Connecticut and Massachusetts are densley populated and small in area as compared to
Kentucky. 159
154 The data presented here is taken from a survey published in Note, 13
Stan. L. Rev. 522 (1961).
155 See appednix, table C.
156 Trebach, 47 Am. Jud. Soc'y 170, 175 (1964).
157 Because Massachusetts also permtis assigned counsel it is probable that
they are
often utilized.
158 Trebach, supra note 156, at 174.
159 Florida appropriated $186,250 for the first year of its statewide defender
program. Fla. Acts ch. 63-110 (1963).
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B. Compensated Assigned Counsel
(1) Method of Appointment.
Almost no pertinent state statute prescribes a system of appointing counsel, rather they leave the matter to the discretion of
the trial judge wih the resulting unfavorable features suggested in
part IV-A. New Jersey, which provides compensation only in
capital cases, has a systematic method of naming counsel. Assignment there is made in rotation from an alphabetical list of all the
attorneys in the county. 00 With local variations, this is also the
"practice" in some other jurisdictions. 161 The "New Jersey system" has two possible advantages; equal distribution of the case
load and the establishment of machinery to implement early representation. However, if adequate compensation is provided assignment will no longer be a burden on members of the bar. Moreover, the second advantage of the system has not generally been
utilized. Furthermore, the disadvantage of appointment from the
whole bar has already been pointed out in part IV-A. That is,
many lawyers are no match for a skilled prosecutor. On the other
hand selective appointment, when compensation is adequate,
could be subject to political abuse, especially where judges are
62
elected.
On the positive side, it is true that some judges often appoint
the lawyer requested by the indigent defendant. Others often
change counsel if the accused is dissatisfied with the first appointee. Also some state statutes provide for the appointment of
two lawyers at the discretion of the court.6 3 While all of these
practices do much to alleviate injustice inherent in such a loose
system there is still no written guarantee of consistent adequate
representation.
The most plausible solution is a selective list of qualified
criminal lawyers to be called upon in rotation and compensated
fairly. Junior members of the bar who are willing could be ap160 Trebach, A Modern Defender System for New Jersey, 12 Rutgers L. Rev.
289, 290 (1957).
161 Kamisar & Choper, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 103 (1963).
162

The methods of appointment and their usual results have been strongly

criticized by several leading commentators. See Beaney, The Right to Counsel in

American Courts 200-20 (1955); Brownell, Legal Aid in the United States
(1951); Kadish & Kimball, The Representation of the Indigent in Criminal Cases
in Utah, 4 Utah L. Rev. 198 (1954).
163 E.g., Ala. Code tit. 15, § 18 (1958).
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pointed to aid the chief counsel. Such a system is approved by one
commentator, who cautioned that: "it would appear unfair to
those few qualified attorneys unless compensation were provided
' 4 (Emat a level comparable to fees obtained in private practice."
pahis added.)
Such a system, if properly set up, could also be utilized to provide counsel early in the proceedings. 165
The possible deficiencies of such a system are twofold: (1) a
dearth of competent criminal lawyers in a particular county or
judicial district and (2) a lack of qualified lawyers willing to
serve as assigned counsel. The latter contingency is not insuperable while the former would doom any system except possibly the
public defender.
(2) Fees.
The statutory provisions for payment of counsel range from
general rules to specific prescriptions covering a multitude of
situations. Several states such as Colorado leave the amount of
compensation up to the court to set and are otherwise silent except
some provide that counsel must present an estimate of his fee. 166
In Vermont the state auditor sets the fee. 167 Other states permit the
court to set the fee but provide certain maximum and/or minimum amounts. These amounts vary from 25 dollars to 50 dollars
for any case in Arkansas168 to 1500 dollars for the defense of a
capital case in New York. 169 Besides differentiating between the
type of case such as Virginia's maximum of 150 dollars in capital
17 0
cases and serious felonies and 50 dollars for other felonies,
some statutes also set different pay scales for work in court and out
of court. 71 Oregon varies the fee with the plea or the court in
1 2
which the case is being heard.
Some state's fees are totally inadequate 173 while others are
164 Note, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 812, at 834 (1959).
165 See part IV-A, supra.
166Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §

39-21-9 (1963).
'67 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 6505 (1958).
168 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2415 (Repl. vol. 1964).
1690 N.Y.Code Crim. Proc. § 308.
17 Va. Code Ann. § 14.1-184 (Supp. 1964).
171 E.g., Minnesota pays a maximum of $50 per day while in court and $25

per day before trial; the court is not limited in amount for appeals. Minm. Stat.
Ann. 7§2 611.07 (1964).
1

Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.770 (Cum. supp. 1961).

173 N.D. Cent. Code § 29-01-27 (1960) ($50 maximum per case).
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fair.17 4 Several of the statutory schemes in this area are subject to
criticism. Some provide for little more than nominal payment and
so do little to remedy the ills of the uncompensated system.
Statutes which fail to differentiate between the lawyer who spends
one day on a felony case and pleads his client guilty from an attorney who goes to trial and appeals are likewise subject to abuse,
especially if the maximum fee is too low. Certainly some discretion
should be given the payor in order to provide for flexibility to
meet varying situations, but, the trial judge, the logical payor, is
subject to political pressures where elected. If the judge is given
discretion to set a fee within statutory limits it is probable that
the practice of granting the maximum regardless of performance,
will evolve in some districts. It is also possible that when specific
provisions are made for payment; per day, in and out of court, at
trial and on appeal; the appointee may take advantage of the
system and go to trial when his best action would be a compromise with the prosecutor.
The basic criticism of all these statutory provisions is that each
is subject to some type of abuse. These suggestions are not a wholesale indictment of the integrity of the bench and bar. No doubt,
a statute providing for fair fees within certain limits will be
equitably administered within the court's discretion. Nevertheless,
one purpose of compensation is adequate representation and any
possible abuses of the system which endanger the realization of
this purpose should be closely scrutinized.
Those statutes which do not set specific amounts but instead
permit the trial court to grant a "reasonable" fee are not perfect
either. Three recent cases contesting the amount allowed by the
trial court reveal that "reasonable" compensation apparently does
not mean "full" compensation. One court summed up the philosophy often attached to compensated assigned counsel systems:
However, the very fact that our scheme of compensation is
couched in indefinite terms rather than precise monetary
figures leads us to find an intent that the amount awarded
should be somewhat more than a mere token or honorarium
appearing to be the result in many states, even though the recompense must be considerably less than what would be con174 E.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann § 2941.51 (Page supp. 1964) (no limit in any
homicide case; all other felonies $300 maximum).
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sidered full compensation were the accused able to pay. (Emphasis added.)1 75
It also appears that the courts are permitted to rule whether or
not time expended by counsel was necessary. 176 All three of these
cases involved counsel appointed to defend indigents accused of
murder. In Conway counsel spent over 800 hours in out of court
preparation and thirty-nine days at trial before submitting a bill
for 18,486.55 dollars which the trial court disallowed and instead
granted 6,500 dollars. On appeal it appeared that appeallant had
charged according to a rate one-third less than the standard set by
the Wisconsin State Bar Association. The appellate court modified
the verdict and allowed 7,620 dollars applying a hindsight test as
to what a reasonable amount of time is, as well as rejecting the
argument that the fee schedule of the bar association was in anyway determinative of a reasonable fee. The courts in both Horton
and Hill also rejected the fee schedule argument.
Although it is possible that these three opinions, in view of the
high amounts requested, are based upon necessity rather than
principle, it seems that a double standard such as this is a threat to
any system designed to cure the ills of uncompensated assignment.
The Conway opinion has been criticized as endangering the type
of representation an indigent receives. 177 As pointed out before,
failure to grant adequate compensation perpetuates the appointment of inexperienced and less competent attorneys as well as
178
frustrating adequate preparation.
(3) Expenses.
Some states specifically permit remuneration of counsel for the
expenses he suffers in presenting a defense. 179 In addition many
other states provide for fees without statutory limit, and presumably such statutes can be interpreted to allow reimbursement
of reasonable out of pocket expenses. 8 0 Georgia and New York
allow expenses only in capital cases.' 8 ' The New York statute speciState v. Horton, 34 N.J. 518, 170 A.2d 1, at 8 (1961). Accord, Hill v.
1 See Conway v. Saulk County, 19 Wis. 2d 599, 120 N.W.2d 671 (1963).
177 1964 Wis. L. Rev. 507 (1964).
178 See e.g., Mass, Public Defenders, 46 J. Crim. L. C. &P. S. 199 (1955).
179 E.g., Kans. Stat. Ann. § 62-1304 (1964). See also statutes referred to in
note 59 supra for Minnesota, New Hampshire, Ohio and Wisconsin.
180 E.g., Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-6513 (Supp. 1963).
181 Ga. Code Ann. § 27-3002 (Supp. 1963); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 308.
'75

Superior
76 Court, 46 Cal. 2d 169, 293 P.2d 10 (1956).
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fically allows fees for expert witnesses. 8 2 It is possible that statutes
providing only for "expenses" could be read to include experts'
fees. Other states make no provision beyond the limited fees prescribed by statute, and in general these are not adequate to cover
a thorough independent investigation or to hire an expert witness.
The importance of financial resources available to assigned
counsel for pre-trial investigation were underscored in parts III
and IV-A. Any system omitting a provision for this is in83
complete.
1"$
N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 308.
1
83 It would seem that the recent cases involving "right to counsel" and
and "equal protection of the laws" could logically be extended to encompass
things other than counsel necessary to a detendant to get a complete hearing.
SuCn things as scientitic evidence; handwriting experts; medical experts; psychiatric experts; ballistic experts, etc., may be used to the advantage of the
accused as well as the state. See Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for
Indtgent Criminal Defendants, 47 Min. L. Rev. 1054 (19W). The new Federal
Crinunal Justice Act states that an indigent criminal defendant "unable to obtain
investigative, expert or other services necessary to an adequate defense in his case
many request them in an ex parte application." 18 U.S.C. I 3006(A) (Supp. 1964).
Although the extreme view that places this type of aid in the category of a
constitutional guarantee has never specifically received endorsement by the courts
one state official has recognized the right. 1958-59 Va. Op. Atty. Gen. 97 (Nov.
3, 1958); 1963 Va. Op. Atty. Gen. 93 (June 80, 1964). The Supreme Court dechned to rule on the question in 1963 when the Texas Assistant AttorneyGeneral conceded on oral argument that denying the indigent petitioner the right
to an independent psychiatrist provided by the state, was possibly prejudicial. 'Ihe
Court remanded in light of this concession without deciding the issue. Bush v.
Texas, 372 U.S. 586 (1963). One commentator thinks that our legal system
"simply hasn't evolved" far enough to make this a constitutional right.
The Rationing of Justice 137 (1964). Although the question may remain open for
years the recent decision of the Court in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487
(1963), while dealing only with the narrower question of an indigent's right to
a free transcript, could be read to imply such a broad constitutional right as suggested here exists. Two earlier federal cases refused appointment of a psychiatrist and a tax accountant to aid an indigent defendant. United States v.
Brodson, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1957); United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192
F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1951). However, on a later habeas corpus petition the Bush
case held that the denial of any psychiatric testimony (either for or against the
defendant) is a denial of counsel and fair trial when sanity is an issue. Bush v.
McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Tex. 1964). Of course these three cases can
be squared by saying that as long as an impartial expert testifies on an issue substantially determinative of the case constitutional guarantees have been met.
However, United States v. Germany, 32 F.R.D. 421 (M.D. Ala. 1963) stands for
a broader interpretation of the right to "effective assistance of counsel." "An
essential ingredient to an attorney effectively representing a defendant in a
criminal case . . . is the funds to pay necessary and essential expenses of inter4ewing the material witnesses and in viewing the scene of the alleged crime."
Id. at 423. Even accepting the principle espoused by those who seek to include
"extras" as part of the sixth amendment right to counsel it is difficult to ascertain
just how far this right -ill extend. Compare, Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d
715, with, Adams v. United States, 337 F.2d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1964). These cases,
heard by the same court in the same year, involved the right to aid in addition
of counsel. In the Washington case a person placed in jail after a preliminary
hearing found "probable cause" to hold him was ordered released because the
committing magistrate denied his request for a court appointed stenographer to
(Continued on next page)
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Generally statutes providing for payment of expenses set up a
procedure of application to the court for payment in accordance
with an itemized statement of costs. Usually the only limit is
"reasonable expenses" although two states set a maximum.ls 4

(4) Cost.
The California system provides a good yardstick to compare
the costs of public defender and compensated assigned counsel
systems. California leaves the choice of system and amount of
compensation to each county. Solano County, population 143,597,
has an assigned counsel system while Marin County, population
146,820, has a public defender office. During the 1959-60 fiscal
year 134 felonies were committed in Solano and 133 in Marin.
The budgets of the counties for their respective systems were;
Solano-16,000 dollars, Marin-13,528 dollars. 8 5 While these figures do not reveal the actual cost per case tried or appealed they at
least indicate that a public defender office can be operated more
cheaply than an assigned counsel system.
C. PrivateDefenders
The experience in the District of Columbia in which a system
of public defenders supplemented by assigned counsel has
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

record the testimony at the preliminary hearing. In the Adams case petitioner
was seeking review of the district court's denial of his request for postconviction
relief based on the trial court's refusal to either appoint an independent psychiatrist or to have him committed foL observation in order to effectively urge his
defense of insanitv. The majority refused to even hear the case on appeal. However, Chief Judge Bazelon registered a dissent stating, "There is increasing recognition that distinctions worked by wealth have no place in the administration of
justice. It may be, of course, that at some point the Government may refuse
further assistance to an indigent making claims on its resources, as, perhaps, when
his claim is patently frivolous, or is revealed to be without substantial merit after
preliminary relevant inquiry. But . .. judicial failure to order an adequate inquiry into Adams' mental condition may have been as serious a denial of
constitutional rights as a refusal to appoint counsel." 337 F.2d at 549 (footnotes
omitted. See generally Simone & Richardson, The Indigent and His Right to
Legal Assistance in Criminal Cases, 8 St. Louis U.L.J. 15 (1963); Goldstein &
Fine, The Indigent Accused, the Psychiatrist, and the Insanity Defense,
110 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1061 (1962); Frank, Today's Problems in the Administration of
Criminal Justice, 15 F.R.D. 93 (1953); Cross, The Assistance of Counsel for His
Defense: Is this Becoming a Meaningless Guarantee, 38 A.B.A.J. 995 (1952);
Note, Aid for Indigent Defendant's in Federal Courts, 52 Calif. L. Rev. 832
(1958). In conclusion it is suggested that aid in addition to counsel is not only
desirable but possibly a constitutional requirement and should be provided for in
any new comprehensive legislation dealing with the right to counsel for indigent
defendants.
184 Ga. Code Ann. § 27-3001 (Supp. 1963) ($500); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 621304 (1964) ($300 including fee).
185 Note, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 522, 563 (1961).
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been in operation for four years has been good. Our public defender organization is not responsible either to the office of the
Attorney General or to the courts. The judges choose eight
trustees from the private bar. These trustees supervise the
operation of the Agency and report annually to the Congress,
to the Department of Justice and to Criminal Courts. The
Agency handles approximately 507 of the criminals represented by assigned counsel. The expenses by the assigned
counsel are reimbursed by the agency. The agency maintains
investigators for the use of the assigned counsel. Thus far the
system has worked very well. 18
The unique system in Washington, D. C. is financed by the
federal government, yet it still relies to a great extent on assigned
counsel. Voluntary defender organizations financed through charity generally afford less than comprehensive representation and
18 7
are not suited to rural areas.
VI.

CONCLUSION:

A

PROPOSAL

The foregoing survey and analysis lead to two inescapable conclusions: (1) the right to counsel area is a burgeoning field of
constitutional law; (2) the systems implemented elsewhere to
meet constitutional minimums as well as practical difficulties are
diverse. With this in mind a comprehensive system to meet the
challenge is suggested for Kentucky. This proposal is an attempt
to borrow the best parts of other systems and suggestions and to
apply them to the particular problems posed in Kentucky. 188
The proposed legislation fits the mold of neither the public or
private defender. It rejects paid assigned counsel programs as
inadequate stop-gaps.
The system would be set up by statute in broad terms which
would leave most of the policy and rule making to a private com180Letter from A. Kenneth Pye, Associate Dean, Georgetown University
Law Center to George T. Rabe, Assistant Attorney General of Kentucky, July 9,

1964.

16s7 Pollack,

45 Minn. L. Rev. 787 (1961).

188 It should be noted that the following proposal was conceived by the

author with much assistance and encouragement from the Attorney General and

members of his staff. A somewhat similar proposal by Arnold Trebach, one of the
most respected authorities in this area, later came to the author's attention. Trebach, A Proposed Defender System for New Jersey, 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 289
(1957). The two proposals, aside from differences dictated by the problems
peculiar to the states for which they are suggested, are somewhat similar. The
author is pleased with the similarities and no doubt would have adonted them
sooner bad he read the Trebach article. Nevertheless, he bows in deference to
Mr. Trebach in all suggestions in which the latter has pre-empted him.
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mittee incorporated as a non-profit organization and granted
certain specific statutory power. It is felt that the existence of a
non-governmental governing body armed with sufficient power
and funds will be more acceptable to those who distrust government intervention in the area. It certainly will eliminate most
political considerations and objections.
The statute is drafted to permit the defender committee to
appoint a defender for every judicial circuit. It does not dictate
salary and other details. Instead the committee is free to assay
the requirements and peculiarities of each judicial circuit and to
contract on an individual basis with the attorney it chooses to be
the defender. It is submitted that such latitude will permit an arrangement suited to the needs of the area with size, population,
crime rate and other variables taken into consideration.
The statute further provides for the committee to set policy
concerning how soon after arrest representation will begin. It also
permits representation in post-conviction remedy proceedings' 8 9
and other non-criminal matters which the committee may approve.
Representation in most misdemeanor cases is also urged upon the
General Assembly. 190 All appellate litigation would be conducted
189 See Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961). See also Lane v. Brown,
372 U.S. 768 (1963).
190 This provision would permit the defender to represent indigents in all misdemeanors except in cases where the fine is not limited to twenty dollars by
statute or where a city ordinance has been breached. See KRS 25.010,
26.010 (1963). There is growing ferment to the affect that the sixth amendment
guarantee applies to misdemeanor offenses. This has been held to be the rule in
federal misdemeanors triable in the district court. Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633
(D.C Cir. 1942). The Supreme Court has said in dictum: "By virtue of the
[sixth amendment] ... counsel must be furnished to an indigent defendant prosecuted in a federal court in every case ....
Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 13637 (1947). A recent federal case has applied this principle to state courts in a
rather serious misdemeanor case involving a $500 fine and ninety days in jail.
Harvey v. Mississippi, 840 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965). One accused of crime has
the right to the assistance of counsel before entering a plea because of the
serious consequences which may attend a guilty plea. Such disadvantages and
consequences may weigh as heavily on an accused misdemeanant as an accused
felon. Id. at 269. At least twenty-one states require that counsel be assigned in
"all" criminal cases. Simone & Richardson, The Indigent & His Right to Legal Assistance in Criminal Cases, 8 St. Louis U.L.J. 15, 49-50 (1963). This permits
assignment in misdemeanor cases if so interpreted. E.g., In re Newbern, 53 Cal.
2d 786, 790, 350 P.2d 116, 119 (1960). However, it seems that even in California this right is mainly observed in its denial. Note, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 522.
523-25 (1961). Some states not only specifically provide for appointed
counsel in misdemeanor cases but pay them as well. E.g., W. Va. Code Ann, §
6190 (1961). In view of the recent counsel cases it seems best to make provision for representation of misdemeanants. See generally Note, Right to Counsel
in Misdemeanor Cases, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 501 (1961).
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through a single-separate office on the theory that appellate
advocacy is a specialty separate from trial advocacy.
Provisions are also made for the borderline indigent who may
have some, but not enough, funds. Here representation can be
shared with a private attorney.
The system would be supported in part by appropriations by
the General Assembly as well as charitable contributions. It is
quite possible that funds for a pilot program of this nature would
be supplied by National Legal Aid and Defenders Association
which has used part of its 4.3 million dollar grant from the Ford
Foundation to encourage such projects. 191
Such a system would not abolish the admirable practice of attorneys devoting free time to defend indigents. It would encourage
it. At the same time, however, only competent attorneys would
be chosen and then only upon volunteering.
In short, the proposed statute is flexible enough to meet
constitutional changes while at the same time providing a workable program. If nothing else it is hoped that this suggestion will
prickle the ears of the legal profession in Kentucky and rally support to a movement which will: "[R] easses and change Kentucky's
archaic system of assigning lawyers without compensation to repre192
sent indigent criminal defendants.
AcT
1. Kentucky Defender Committee. There shall be a Kentucky
Defender Committee consisting of the judges of the Court of Appeals, the deans of the law schools of the Commonwealth and a
representative of the state bar association. The Chief Justice shall
serve as chairman.
VII. PROPOSED KENTUCKY DEFENDER

2. Duties. It shall be the primary duty of the committee to
provide legal counsel at every stage of the proceedings against
criminal defendants unable to do so themselves. In fulfulling this
duty the committee shall;
(a) appoint a defender for each judicial district of the Commonwealth;
191
92 N.L.A.D.A., Guidelines For Adequate Defense Systems 9 (1964).

1 Matthews, To Make the Unfee'd Lawyer a Footnote History, 28 Ky. B.J.
18 (November 1964).
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(b) appoint assistant defenders where necessary;
(c) appont an appellate defender and such assistants as he
may require;
(d) set the salary of each appointee;
(c) appoint an appellate defender and such assistants as he
by each defender office;
(f) make the rules and regulations necessary for the carrying out of the duties of the committee and the defenders.
3. Powers. Aside from the duties enumerated in 2 which also
include the power to so act, the committee may:
(a) accept gifts, grants and contributions or services from
any source, public or private, and may expend the same to
acheive the purposes of this Act;
(b) incorporate under the laws of the Commonwealth as
a non-profit corporation;
(c) appoint an executive secretary who shall carry out such
duties as the committee may authorize;
(d) compensate the executive secretary at a sum not to
exceed $
per year and set by the committee;
(e) make proper requests for financial aid from each session
of the General Assembly after formulating and presenting an
itemized budget;
(f) remove for breach of duty, as spelled out in this Act
and any rules or regulations adopted by the committee, any
defender or assistant defender; provided that a public hearing
may be required by either party to such action;
(g) authorize study into the administration of criminal
justice in the Commonwealth.
4. Defender. Each judicial district in the Commonwealth
shall have a defender.
5. Qualifications.Each defender shall be an attorney licensed
to practice before the Court of Appeals and shall have practiced
law for at least years in the Commonwealth. The committee
may set up any other uniform qualifications which it deems necessary;
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6. Assistants. Each assistant defender shall be an attorney
licensed to practice before the Court of Appeals. The committee
may set up any other uniform qualifications which it deems
necessary.
7. Appointment. The defender for each district and his assistants shall be appointed by the committee upon the committee's
own motion or the recommendation of the organized bar of the
district. The appointment is for four years subject to removal for
cause as outlined in 3 (f).
8. Appellate Defender. There shall be one appellate defender
appointed by the committee on the recommendation of the state
bar association or the motion of any member of the committee.
He shall serve for four years subject to removal for cause as outlined in 3 (f).
9. Regulations. All provisions of this Act concerning defenders are equally applicable to the appellate defender.
10. Nonpartisan Office. The political persuasion of any applicant for the office of defender, appellate defender or assistant or
anyone already holding such office shall in no way influence his
appointment, re-appointment, salary, expenses or removal.
11. Duties of the Defender. It shall be the duty of a defender
to represent any person arrested and charged with a crime over
which the circuit court of his judicial district has exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction, as the committee may direct or when the
defender deems it necessary in the interests of justice to represent the person charged, if:
(a) the defendant so requests; or
(b) the circuit court, on its own motion or otherwise, so
orders and the defendant does not affirmatively and intelligently reject the opportunity to be so represented; and the
defendant meets the requirements of this Act concerning inability to retain private counsel.
12. Duties of Appellate Defender. It shall be the duty of the
appellate defender to represent persons convicted of a crime by
the Commonwealth and seeking review of their case by the Court
of Appeals if the person so desires and otherwise meets the require-
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ments concerning the inability to retain private counsel as spelled
out in this Act.
13. Financial Report. Every person who seeks the services of
the defender for trial under this Act must at or before arraignment submit a financial statement under oath, setting forth his
current assets and liabilties, source or sources of income and names
of persons able to support him or her or from whom he or she is

entitled to support.
14. Confidential.The financial statement shall be confidential
and shall be used only in connection with the determination of
the individual's financial worth insofar as it affects his or her
eligibility for representation by the defender.
15. Trial Judge. In following the dictates of 13, the trial judge,
upon arraignment, should determine whether an unrepresented
person seeks the aid of the defender and if such aid is sought, a
continuance to enable the preparation of the financial statement should be granted if necessary.
16. Eligibility for Assistance. If after submission of the financial statement and the conclusion of any independent investigation
into the claimant's financial situation it is concluded that the
claimant is a pauper, he shall continue to be represented by the
defender without charge. In the event the claimant is not a pauper
but does lack sufficient funds or means to carry on an adequate
defense, the defender may defend him on the condition that the
claimant shall pay to the committee so much as the Court and the
defender deem advisable.
Or in the same situation last mentioned, the defender may
advise the defendant to retain counsel of his own choosing to aid
the defender in conducting the defense, said private counsel to be
paid whatever sum agreed to by the partially needy person, and
said private counsel to contribute to the case so much time as the
agreed upon fee permits, subject to the approval of the defender.
17. When Not Eligible. When from the financial report and
investigation it appears that the defendant can afford to retain
private counsel exclusively, he should be so advised by the Court;
and the defender shall not continue to represent such a person
unless further investigation reveals a need to do so.
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18. Right to RepresentationAfter Arrest. The right to representation by the defender shall attach upon arrest or at such time
thereafter as the committee shall designate. The lack of a financial
affadavit at this point shall not postpone the right to representation. If upon arraignment or thereafter the defendant qualifies for
further representation according to the provisions of this Act, he
shall be represented by the defender or his assistant at trial,
sentencing, appeal and post conviction proceedings. Provided further that anyone represented by the defender prior to the determination of his eligibility for such representation who fails to qualify
for such representation shall pay a fee designated by the committee for the services rendered by the defender. Nothing in this
Act should be construed to grant an absolute right to counsel the
denial of which, without resulting prejudice, would be grounds
for reversal.
19. Loyalty to Defendant. It shall be the primary duty of each
defender and assistant to represent needy criminal defendants assigned them, to the utmost of their particular abilities and in
conformity with the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association to the same extent that any lawyer is duty bound to
represent his client.
20. Expenses. Each defender shall keep an itemized record of
clerical, investigatory and other expenses incurred during each
term of Court in the fulfillment of his office and shall have the
same certified as legitimate and reasonable by the judge of the
district in which he practices and forwarded to the committee for
approval and payment. Refusal by the judge to certify these expenses shall entitle the defender to a hearing before the committee to determine the reasonableness of the claimed expenditure.
21. Office Space-Clerical Help. It shall be determined by the
committee whether to provide office space, clerical help and
miscellaneous necessities for any part-time defender;
(a) on a pro rata basis depending on the amount of time
the particular defender spends in private law practice; or
(b) as an expense directly and wholly incurred by the committee if the defender is full-time; or
(c) by making adjustments in the defender's annual salary.
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22. Full-Time Defender. Any defender being paid an annual
salary in excess of $
, exclusive of expense allowances, is a
full-time defender and may not practice law except in accordance
with the provisions of this Act.
23. Part-Time Defenders. Any defender being paid an annual
salary less than $
-,
exclusive of expense allowances is a
part-time defender and may not practice criminal law except in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
24. No Fees. In no event may a defender or an assistant demand or accept any payment, monetary or otherwise, from anyone,
except as provided in this Act, for representing one accused of or
convicted of a crime in this Commonwealth.
25. Preference to Duty. Any defender or assistant defender
shall give priority and preference to his duties under the provisions of this Act. In no case is a defender or his assistant permitted to practice any form of criminal law except in carrying out
the duties of his office. The practice of civil law may be carried on
insofar as the committee permits by: uniform regulation for fulltime defenders; agreement with part-time defenders and assistants.
In no case, however, should the private practice of law interfere
with or prevent the performance of the office.
26. Local Help. Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as
to discourage local bar associations or private practicioners from
offering voluntary aid and assistance to the committee and the
local defender. It is the policy of the Commonwealth to promote
a system of fair representation to all criminal defendants in the
manner best suited, in the judgement of the committee, to the
particular judicial district.
27. Name of Act. The foregoing sections (1-26) shall be known
as the Kentucky Defender Act.
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Table A*
County &
Population

Expenses

Salary

Mann (164,000)
Public Defender $7,356 - $8,520
Deputy

Merced (90,446)
Tulare (168,403)
Public Defender
Deputy
Yolo (65,727)
Yuba (38,859)
Sacramento
(502,778)

No. of Cases
Per Yeara

Per Case
Approx. Cost

$1,200

220

$51

$6,584b
No
Figures

120
330

$87
$25c

$ 700
$1,200

130
120

$55
$58

1,357

$45

$4,080 - $5,100

$3,900
$5,400
$3,000
$6,480
$5,772
$62,127d

a. "Cases" includes all criminal defendants and persons represented in
"mental illness" proceedings, except in the Sacramento county which represents the
number of felony complaints for the year.
b. Includes full time secretary.
c. This average does not include expenses.
d. Includes the entire budget for one year.
0 This table compares the cost of defender systems in California. The six
counties are roughly analogous in population to the different judicial circuits in
Kentucky.

Table B
Following is the questionnaire sent to all circuit judges in Kentucky handling criminal cases, as well as a compilation of the results
as of July 27, 1964. Twenty-four of the fifty judges had answered at
that time. It should be noted that several questions call for percentages.
These answers are not exact because of the lack of records in such
areas. Moreover, the results of several questions calling for general nonuniform answers are not compiled because of space limitations.
1. What is the percentage of criminal defendants who come before you
claiming indigency and requesting appointed counsel?
(c) 41-60% 6
(b) 21-40% 4
(a) 0-20% 4
(e) 81-100% 1
(d) 61-80% 9
2. What is the percentage of criminal defendants who come before
you and waive their right to counsel?
(c) 41-60% 1
(b) 21-40% 1
(a) 0-20% 14
None 8
(e) 81-100%--(d) 61-80% -
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3. In what percentage of the cases in which defendant has waived
counsel has it later seemed that there were sufficient grounds for a
defense to have made representation valuable?
(a) 0- 5% 14
(b) 6-10% 1
(c) 11-15%-(d) 16-20%

-

(e)

More

-

None

9

4. When counsel is requested by an indigent criminal defendant, what
method do you employ in choosing the appointee? (Please explain in
detail giving how lists are compiled; whether choice is in order or
random; whether you or someone else makes the choice; whether one
or more attorneys are chosen for particular cases.)
None-1
Younger Atty'n-2
Atty'n available-6
Order (entire bar)-7
List of Cr.L. at random-S
From list (Acc. to cases
Order (Cr. Lawyers)-i
not order)-8
No answer-1
5. At what time will an indigent's request for appointed counsel be
honored?
(a) on arrest? --(b) before examining trial? --(c) at
examining trial? --(d) before indictment by grand jury?
(e) after indictment by grand jury? --(f) at arraignment?

6. If your answer to 5 was (e) or (f), how much time does counsel
have to interview his client before arraignment?
None-2
1 Week-2
Whatever necessary-15
S0 Minutes-1
On request 24 Hrs- %
No answer-S
7. In appointing counsel, to what segments of the bar, if any, are
your assignments limited?
None-16
Experienced in type of case-1
Younger 2/3's of bar-1
Criminal Experience-4

Younger if possible-2
8. Is this segment so small as to place a serious burden upon its
members?
No-15
Yes-4
No answer-5
9. To what degree is there difficulty in obtaining counsel for all indigents who request it?
(a) substantial difficulty-2 (b) some difficulty-2
(c) very little difficulty-20
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10. Do you compel lawyers, who refuse or object to assignment withNo -out a bona fide reason, to serve? Yes --11. For what types of cases is it especially difficult to obtain counsel?
12. (A) Are only lawyers wtih criminal experience assigned?
Yes-14 No-10
(B) Are only lawyers with trial experience assigned? Yes-10 No-5
(C) What other limitations do you place on the group from which
counsel is chosen?
None-24
(D) Are the lawyers assigned often younger and less experienced
than the prosecutor?
Yes-1 No-li
(E) In what types of cases do you attempt to obtain more experienced
counsel?
Capital cases-10
Serious cases-10
None-1
(F) In general, do you consider the experience of assigned counsel
(1)more than adequate-4 (2) adequate-18 (3) inadequate-2
(4) seriously inadequate
13.How do you determine the verity of a plea of indigency?
Open Ct. Exam-ll
On claim-7
Extra-jud. Exam-6
14. Explain any investigations in connection with this?
Bond-1
None-19
Lawyer App't-2
Other-2
15. (A) Do you think the system is being abused by persons not
actually indigent?
Yes-20 No-4
(B) If yes, to what extent?
16. To what extent would you say the defense is hampered by the
unavailability of funds for investigation?
(a) substantially-9 (b) slightly-14 (c) not at all-i
17. Does the prosecution make available records in order to ameliorate
the lack of funds for defense investigation?
Yes-23 No-1
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18. Is there any way the defense can use the prosecutions investigatory facilities?
Yes-10 No-14
19. In each of the following respects, please compare the performance
of assigned counsel with that of retained counsel.
(a) Frequency of guilty pleas. More-14 Equal-10 Fewer
(b) Skill in challenging the admission of objectionable evidence.
Greater Equal-20 Less-4
(c) Skill in protecting the record for appeal. Greater
Equal-17 Less-7
(d) Assistance in achieving the proper disposition of a case fater
conviction.
Greater-2 Equal-11 Less-11
20. What general comment would you have on the quality of representation provided by assigned counsel?
21. How frequently is a particular lawyer assigned to defend an indigent?
Depends-9
3 - 10 Years-1
Once a term for trial-2
1- 4 Years-10
Often-1
Each case (one co.)-1
22. In your estimation, in what percentage of cases does the assigned
counsel spend in out of court preparation?
zero to three hours .................... 56.5 -approx.
three to twelve hours ................ 32.88-approx.
more than twelve hours ............ 13 -approx.
23. In general how adequate is assigned counsel's preparation?
Very adequate-14 Inadequate-4 Seriously inadequate-0
No opinion-1
24. Do you feel that the out-of-pocket expenses assigned counsel must
bear are a (12) trivial burden, (10) burdensome, or (2) highly
burdensome?
25. What is the general reaction of attorneys when assigned to an
indigent defendant?
Displeased-4 Neutral-15 Pleased-4
No answer-1
26. How many criminal actions do you hear a year in each county
(name county and give amount) of your circuit?
See Chart.
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27. For what kind of charges will you appoint counsel for indigents?
Felonies that go to trial-li
Felonies & Mis. (High)-11
On request-2
28. Do you ever appoint counsel in non-criminal matters? (Please
explain)
No-19
Dom. Rel.-2
Mental-3
29. Taking into consideration the local problems in your circuit, which
if any of the following systems do you think preferable to the court
appointed or designated counsel method?
(A) A full or part-time paid public deefnder for the county-4*
(B) A paid public defender for the entire circuit-5*
(C) Appointed counsel remunerated according to a fee set by
Iaw-16*
(D) A private volunteer defender association supported in whole or
in part by public funds-*
Answers of and/or A&C, B&C, C&D
Table C
Judicial Districts in Kentucky
(Based on 1960 Census)
Circuit Crimes*

Comprised of

Population of

Area

(Counties)

Circuit

(Sq. Miles)

1

364

Ballard, Carlisle, Fulton,
Graves, Hickman

61,792

1,226

2
3
4

272
557
494

McCracken
Christian, Lyon, Trigg
Caldwell, Crittenden,
Hopkins
Henderson, Union, Webster

57,306
71,698

239
1,430

60,179
62,300

1,259
1,104

Daviess
Logan, Todd
Warren
Hardin
Bullitt, Hart, Larue, Nelson
Green, Marion, Washington,
Taylor

70,588
32,260
45,491
67,798
62,359

478
1,010
530
606
1,437

55,489

1,202

5

238

6
7
8
9
10
11

315
242
490
90
280
221
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Circuit Crimes*

12

378

13

228
200

218
196
599
146
84
101
251
809
310
596
446
242
502
854

446
3,006
327

218
220
802
682
407
337

261
329
478

649
180

Population of
Comprised of
(Counties)
Circuit
Anderson, Henry, Oldham,
62,268
Shelby, Spencer, Trimble
Boyle, Garrard, Lincoln,
62,103
Mercer
Bourbon, Scott, Woodford
45,467
Boone, Carroll, Gallatin,
51,411
Owen, Grant
120,700
Kenton
86,803
Campbell
Harrison, Nicholas,
36,766
Bracken, Fleming, Mason
42,353
Greenup, Lewis
Bath, Menifee, Roman,
39,659
Montgomery
131,906
Fayette
25,255
Estill, Lee, Owsley
42,083
Johnson, Lawrence, Martin
68,172
Clark, Jessamine, Madison
51,107
Harlan
50,159
Knox, Laurel
46,737
Pulaski, Rockcastel
Adair, Casey, Cumberland,
Jefferson (2 criminal
610,947
branches)
Floyd
41,642
52,163
Boyd
34,961
Perry
38,278
McCreary, Whitley
68,264
Pike
28,518
Knott, Magoffin
38,203
Carter, Elliott, Morgan
Butler, Edmonson, Ohio,
40,676
Hancock
Breathitt, Powell, Wolfe
28,698
44,662
Clinton, Russell, Wayne
Clay, Jackson, Leslie
42,466
Calloway, Livingston,
Marshall
44,700
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Area

(Sq. Miles)
1,451

1,014
738
1,123
163

145
756

837
948
269
669
917
883
478
803
938

387
399
159
335
848

779
650
1,045
1,502
894
1,030
1,184
1,131
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Circuit Crimes*
43
271
44
333

45
46

119
150

47
48
49

159
133
111

Comprised of
(Counties)

Barren, Metcalf

Bell
McLean, Muhlenberg
Breckinridge, Meade,
Grayson
Letcher
Franklin
Allen, Simpson

Population of
Circuit

Area
(Sq. Miles)

36,670
35,336
37,146

788

49,506
30,102
29,421
23,817

1,366
355
199
610

384
725

I According to Report to Judicial Council, Court Docket of Circuit Courts
July 1, 1962-July 1, 1963. (Criminal Docket including cases pending first day
of quarter, cases commenced during the year and changes of venue.)
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